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Human development (HD), a process designed to enhance human lives directly, is contrasted 
with economic development, which entails the expansion of material things intended to fulfill 
human needs. Human development empowers people to participate in the improvement of their 
own well-being. The paper looks at the record of HD in Africa over the period 1970-2005, using 
half-decadal data derived from United Nations sources and national statistical bureaus. It is 
found that over the period analyzed, the human development index improved in all African 
countries except in Zambia, where it declined, due to unfavorable terms of trade and to persistent 
health and governance problems, among challenges. Nonetheless, despite this progress, African 
countries continue to lag behind other regions of the world in HD. There has been little advance 
on the economic development front, where growth plummeted in most African countries, 
impoverishing nearly 50 per cent of the population.  Towards the end of the 1990s, however, 
African economies began  to  recover  due  mainly  to reforms in governance  and distributive 
systems,  and in mechanisms  to protect people against downside risks, including disease 
pandemics, political instabilities, droughts and adverse terms of trade. The paper argues for a 
continuation of reforms in order to further improve economic and human development outcomes 
on the continent. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports.   1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic Development and Human Development 
The term ‘economic development’ refers to a sustainable process that expands the quantity and 
variety of goods and services that people use to satisfy material wants, e.g., the need for food, health 
care and shelter. A widely used summary measure of economic development is the growth in per 
capita income (World Bank, 1978). In contrast, the term ‘human development’ (HD) is used to refer 
to a sustainable process that expands and strengthens people’s capabilities, such as abilities to read 
and write, to avoid premature death, to appear in public without shame, and to enjoy a decent standard 
of living. The best well known indicator of human development is Human Development Index 
(UNDP, 1990). 
 
Acquired capabilities enable people to function in leisure or in work activities (Alkire, 2009). 
Moreover, such ‘functioning’ may be used to achieve other ends, such as engagement in artistic or 
scientific endeavors. An important aspect of human capabilities and functionings is that they are 
intrinsically valuable (Sen, 1999). 
 
The outcome of economic development is a set of things or commodities that can be used to improve 
people’s material well-being, whereas the outcome of human development is a set of people’s 
capabilities, functionings and satisfactions that are part and parcel of human beings (Schultz, 1963). 
Human development is people-centered, in contrast to economic development which is commodity-
centered. However, since commodities are instruments for improving human beings, economic 
development and human development are correlated. Further, since for a variety of reasons such 
correlation may be weak , pursuit of both economic development and human development should be 
the norm in societies.  
 
Going Beyond Conventional Elements of Human Development 
In an investigation of additional components of human development, Ranis et al. (2005), start by 
asking a basic question: ‘which aspects of life might reasonably qualify as part of HD’? (p. 1). After 
reviewing a large literature, and analyzing correlations among aspects of life that reasonably qualify 
as part of HD, Ranis et al. (2005) propose eleven additional elements of HD. Table 1 presents these   2 
elements, highlighting how they might be measured depending on data  availability. Since the 
components shown in Table 1 are not currently part of HD, they are not captured by HDI. To the 
extent that the components in table 1 are valid aspects of human life, the trend in HDI might be a 
misleading indicator of how people’s lives are changing over time or space. However, if HDI is 
strongly correlated with these aspects of life, its time trend or spatial variation would correctly reflect 
the extent of human development even when the aspects are not captured as part of HD. In that case, 
changes in HDI across countries would be a reflection of real differences in the quality of lives across 
populations. 
Table 1: Potential Additional Elements of Human Development   
Element Category  Indicators 
1. Mental state   Male suicide rate, prisoners 
2. Empowerment  Gender empowerment measure 
3. Political Freedom  Political and civil liberties, political terror 
4. Social Relations  Value of friends, value of family, tolerance of 
neighbors’ divorce rate 
5. Community life  Alcohol consumption, natural disasters, 
tolerance of neighbors 
6. Inequalities  Income gini, horizontal inequality, rural/urban 
inequality, health inequality, gross domestic 
income 
7. Work conditions  Unemployment, employment conditions, 
informal sector proportion, minimum wage 
policies 
8. Leisure conditions  Cinema attendance 
9. Economic stability  GDP cycle, CPI cycle, portfolio investment, 
terms of trade 
10. Political instability  Political violence, refugee flows 
11. Environment  Environmental sustainability 
Source: Ranis et al. (2005), Table 14, p. 25. 
 
Although the elements in Table 1 that are least correlated with HDI are candidates for inclusion in the 
HD space, they may not make it to that space due to data limitation. Thus data availability dictates 
aspects of life that can be used to construct HDI. As data on all aspects of human lives become 
available across countries, the composition of the elements in HD space will change. This 
composition will also change as key aspects of life become equitably fulfilled in the population. For 
example, if adult illiteracy were to be eliminated globally, there would be no need to use it to 
construct HDI. Thus, the composition of the elements used to construct HDI should be expected to   3 
change over time, as additional data become available, and as some basic aspects of life become 
universally realized.   
   
II.  HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS 
 
Consistent with the work of Sen (1982, 1999), there are various measures of HD and these measures 
need not be correlated among themselves. However, one measure that now enjoys arguably the 
greatest acclaim is the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI). This section focuses on HD but also 
on poverty, which in developing countries constitutes a center stage of the policy initiatives, 
especially those around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  Tables 2.1 – 2.4 present data 
on the half-decadal pattern of the evolution of HDI and its three components from 1970 to 2005 for 
African countries. Table 2.1 is for the HDI composite (HDIX), which is available for only 35, out of 
possible 55, countries due to missing data. The remaining tables are for the three components: 
education (EDX), life expectancy (LIFEX) and income as measured by GDP (GDPX), respectively.  
Table 2.1 African countries; variable HDIX in levels 
Country  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Avg. 
Algeria  0.475  0.517  0.569  0.617  0.651  0.674  0.707  0.743  0.619 
Angola                   
Benin  0.293  0.320  0.348  0.367  0.379  0.413  0.448  0.486  0.382 
Botswana  0.432  0.505  0.565  0.619  0.674  0.668  0.649  0.668  0.597 
Burkina Faso  0.209  0.233  0.247  0.266  0.281  0.293  0.327  0.363  0.277 
Burundi  0.241  0.249  0.266  0.304  0.322  0.330  0.361  0.390  0.308 
Cameroon  0.378  0.418  0.460  0.509  0.514  0.502  0.507  0.524  0.477 
Cape Verde                   
Central African Republic  0.286  0.317  0.344  0.361  0.367  0.369  0.373  0.380  0.350 
Chad                   
Comoros                   
Congo  0.475  0.533  0.580  0.615  0.607  0.583  0.572  0.575  0.568 
Congo   0.345  0.360  0.370  0.379  0.378  0.355  0.353  0.379  0.365 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.381  0.427  0.456  0.457  0.459  0.454  0.478  0.486  0.450 
Djibouti                   
Egypt  0.429  0.448  0.494  0.539  0.578  0.616  0.655  0.685  0.555 
Equatorial Guinea                   
Eritrea                   
Ethiopia  0.236  0.254  0.264  0.264  0.292  0.311  0.342  0.392  0.294 
Gabon                   
Gambia                   
Ghana  0.366  0.389  0.414  0.423  0.455  0.483  0.494  0.511  0.442 
Guinea                   
Guinea-Bissau                   
Kenya  0.413  0.461  0.511  0.529  0.550  0.540  0.518  0.534  0.507 
Lesotho  0.339  0.364  0.403  0.432  0.493  0.531  0.521  0.506  0.449 
Liberia  0.318  0.343  0.372  0.379  0.349  0.320  0.422  0.437  0.367 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  0.600  0.656  0.727  0.751  0.765  0.794  0.813  0.833  0.742 
Madagascar  0.397  0.429  0.451  0.448  0.459  0.483  0.515  0.542  0.465 
Malawi  0.280  0.316  0.357  0.373  0.394  0.446  0.474  0.471  0.389 
Mali  0.214  0.223  0.246  0.246  0.262  0.283  0.315  0.355  0.268 
Mauritania                   
Mauritius  0.595  0.618  0.649  0.678  0.712  0.738  0.767  0.790  0.693 
Morocco  0.384  0.421  0.463  0.497  0.531  0.559  0.594  0.637  0.511 
Mozambique  0.218  0.258  0.284  0.272  0.297  0.318  0.347  0.386  0.297 
Namibia                   
Niger  0.230  0.223  0.229  0.221  0.229  0.238  0.259  0.326  0.244   4 
Nigeria  0.316  0.371  0.402  0.404  0.426  0.439  0.460  0.497  0.415 
Réunion                   
Rwanda  0.324  0.328  0.355  0.380  0.319  0.304  0.400  0.462  0.359 
Sao Tome and Principe                   
Senegal  0.313  0.328  0.347  0.372  0.392  0.409  0.431  0.457  0.381 
Seychelles                   
Sierra Leone                   
Somalia                   
South Africa  0.608  0.633  0.662  0.683  0.701  0.699  0.683  0.674  0.668 
Sudan  0.334  0.359  0.375  0.391  0.419  0.450  0.483  0.513  0.416 
Swaziland  0.424  0.493  0.531  0.571  0.617  0.621  0.590  0.570  0.552 
Tanzania   0.339  0.386  0.423  0.432  0.436  0.434  0.450  0.484  0.423 
Togo  0.329  0.376  0.422  0.429  0.440  0.458  0.484  0.509  0.431 
Tunisia  0.456  0.507  0.555  0.600  0.639  0.681  0.723  0.757  0.615 
Uganda  0.362  0.379  0.370  0.377  0.385  0.410  0.453  0.492  0.403 
Western Sahara                   
Zambia  0.465  0.483  0.484  0.488  0.488  0.452  0.426  0.437  0.465 
Zimbabwe                   
                   
Africa   0.366  0.398  0.428  0.448  0.465  0.476  0.497  0.522  0.450 
 
 
Table 2.2 African countries; variable EDX in levels  
Country  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Avg. 
Algeria  0.296  0.366  0.436  0.501  0.563  0.624  0.685  0.739  0.526 
Angola                   
Benin  0.135  0.173  0.212  0.233  0.254  0.309  0.364  0.442  0.265 
Botswana  0.373  0.444  0.516  0.588  0.660  0.707  0.751  0.772  0.601 
Burkina Faso  0.067  0.079  0.093  0.117  0.140  0.148  0.191  0.250  0.136 
Burundi  0.165  0.176  0.193  0.269  0.346  0.428  0.511  0.564  0.331 
Cameroon  0.350  0.400  0.445  0.489  0.534  0.563  0.593  0.650  0.503 
Cape Verde                   
Central African Republic  0.191  0.221  0.268  0.307  0.348  0.389  0.430  0.475  0.329 
Chad                   
Comoros                   
Congo  0.422  0.512  0.602  0.639  0.659  0.660  0.661  0.662  0.602 
Congo (DRC)  0.328  0.371  0.415  0.433  0.452  0.501  0.547  0.593  0.455 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.241  0.275  0.309  0.331  0.347  0.358  0.449  0.484  0.349 
Djibouti                   
Egypt  0.353  0.389  0.423  0.468  0.526  0.579  0.630  0.685  0.507 
Equatorial Guinea                   
Eritrea                   
Ethiopia  0.111  0.143  0.175  0.201  0.227  0.266  0.309  0.388  0.227 
Gabon                   
Gambia                   
Ghana  0.319  0.356  0.394  0.428  0.462  0.503  0.543  0.594  0.450 
Guinea                   
Guinea-Bissau                   
Kenya  0.367  0.459  0.550  0.588  0.627  0.648  0.664  0.710  0.577 
Lesotho  0.332  0.355  0.378  0.419  0.531  0.630  0.728  0.763  0.517 
Liberia  0.143  0.192  0.259  0.326  0.392  0.451  0.514  0.582  0.357 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  0.393  0.478  0.596  0.683  0.758  0.809  0.853  0.887  0.682 
Madagascar  0.422  0.481  0.540  0.548  0.555  0.604  0.652  0.698  0.562 
Malawi  0.326  0.365  0.403  0.431  0.474  0.572  0.663  0.668  0.488 
Mali  0.090  0.103  0.121  0.135  0.149  0.192  0.242  0.306  0.167 
Mauritania                   
Mauritius  0.624  0.647  0.671  0.696  0.721  0.754  0.786  0.819  0.715 
Morocco  0.229  0.272  0.316  0.350  0.386  0.436  0.488  0.556  0.379 
Mozambique  0.189  0.248  0.308  0.330  0.352  0.373  0.392  0.462  0.332 
Namibia                   
Niger  0.059  0.067  0.074  0.083  0.092  0.110  0.129  0.271  0.111 
Nigeria  0.229  0.315  0.400  0.452  0.504  0.545  0.586  0.644  0.459 
Réunion                   
Rwanda  0.297  0.331  0.371  0.437  0.503  0.546  0.584  0.651  0.465 
Sao Tome and Principe                   
Senegal  0.181  0.200  0.219  0.249  0.284  0.322  0.360  0.408  0.278 
Seychelles                   
Sierra Leone                   
Somalia                   
South Africa  0.643  0.678  0.714  0.742  0.770  0.790  0.815  0.833  0.748 
Sudan  0.251  0.292  0.332  0.375  0.419  0.458  0.501  0.539  0.396 
Swaziland  0.470  0.524  0.583  0.629  0.667  0.695  0.723  0.749  0.630 
Tanzania   0.302  0.391  0.480  0.502  0.518  0.540  0.563  0.585  0.485 
Togo  0.205  0.287  0.370  0.394  0.418  0.473  0.528  0.579  0.407   5 
Tunisia  0.363  0.406  0.448  0.510  0.574  0.641  0.709  0.769  0.552 
Uganda  0.315  0.354  0.393  0.440  0.487  0.573  0.660  0.687  0.489 
Western Sahara                   
Zambia  0.474  0.512  0.549  0.579  0.610  0.609  0.609  0.608  0.569 
Zimbabwe  0.549  0.599  0.649  0.708  0.760  0.760  0.773  0.784  0.698 
                   
Africa   0.300  0.346  0.395  0.434  0.474  0.516  0.561  0.607  0.454 
 
 
Table 2.3 African countries; variable LIFEX in levels 
Country  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Avg. 
Algeria  0.466  0.521  0.577  0.645  0.700  0.725  0.751  0.778  0.645 
Angola  0.200  0.235  0.259  0.270  0.283  0.295  0.309  0.342  0.274 
Benin  0.341  0.388  0.426  0.449  0.481  0.523  0.556  0.586  0.469 
Botswana  0.493  0.545  0.591  0.630  0.654  0.579  0.428  0.432  0.544 
Burkina Faso  0.275  0.305  0.333  0.355  0.374  0.395  0.423  0.452  0.364 
Burundi  0.313  0.331  0.363  0.386  0.356  0.333  0.365  0.403  0.356 
Cameroon  0.349  0.386  0.435  0.487  0.501  0.477  0.442  0.427  0.438 
Cape Verde  0.525  0.561  0.608  0.650  0.682  0.710  0.733  0.759  0.653 
Central African Republic  0.283  0.343  0.390  0.410  0.405  0.386  0.357  0.353  0.366 
Chad  0.327  0.356  0.388  0.422  0.437  0.428  0.405  0.391  0.394 
Comoros  0.379  0.417  0.449  0.482  0.524  0.573  0.614  0.651  0.511 
Congo  0.490  0.539  0.577  0.591  0.571  0.518  0.476  0.471  0.529 
Congo (DRC)  0.314  0.335  0.358  0.376  0.380  0.355  0.356  0.377  0.356 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.367  0.456  0.511  0.529  0.538  0.530  0.508  0.516  0.494 
Djibouti  0.304  0.341  0.376  0.406  0.430  0.458  0.476  0.491  0.410 
Egypt  0.424  0.471  0.526  0.582  0.632  0.680  0.721  0.742  0.597 
Equatorial Guinea  0.246  0.271  0.297  0.328  0.362  0.389  0.396  0.405  0.337 
Eritrea  0.305  0.326  0.318  0.330  0.385  0.455  0.516  0.556  0.399 
Ethiopia  0.299  0.320  0.315  0.324  0.366  0.403  0.440  0.479  0.368 
Gabon  0.362  0.426  0.491  0.561  0.602  0.605  0.582  0.574  0.525 
Gambia  0.259  0.307  0.358  0.404  0.437  0.461  0.482  0.502  0.401 
Ghana  0.398  0.436  0.467  0.492  0.537  0.568  0.549  0.526  0.497 
Guinea  0.236  0.269  0.309  0.346  0.388  0.428  0.471  0.520  0.371 
Guinea-Bissau  0.203  0.224  0.253  0.291  0.314  0.328  0.347  0.366  0.291 
Kenya  0.453  0.499  0.545  0.573  0.581  0.541  0.464  0.458  0.514 
Lesotho  0.400  0.431  0.480  0.522  0.572  0.564  0.425  0.331  0.466 
Liberia  0.324  0.359  0.377  0.373  0.392  0.440  0.491  0.534  0.411 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  0.439  0.499  0.581  0.657  0.714  0.756  0.788  0.806  0.655 
Madagascar  0.314  0.347  0.386  0.404  0.431  0.484  0.525  0.566  0.432 
Malawi  0.259  0.296  0.330  0.360  0.405  0.449  0.433  0.434  0.371 
Mali  0.209  0.228  0.251  0.277  0.300  0.320  0.344  0.373  0.287 
Mauritania  0.378  0.414  0.461  0.495  0.511  0.521  0.525  0.524  0.479 
Mauritius  0.620  0.649  0.680  0.713  0.737  0.752  0.772  0.784  0.713 
Morocco  0.443  0.487  0.545  0.604  0.652  0.693  0.728  0.757  0.614 
Mozambique  0.237  0.276  0.297  0.296  0.307  0.348  0.378  0.378  0.315 
Namibia  0.459  0.503  0.548  0.585  0.620  0.631  0.563  0.560  0.559 
Niger  0.219  0.228  0.240  0.256  0.277  0.309  0.357  0.411  0.287 
Nigeria  0.256  0.296  0.329  0.332  0.326  0.328  0.348  0.371  0.323 
Réunion  0.623  0.679  0.725  0.766  0.798  0.822  0.838  0.852  0.763 
Rwanda  0.323  0.329  0.348  0.363  0.128  0.069  0.302  0.390  0.282 
Sao Tome and Principe  0.508  0.542  0.575  0.602  0.622  0.634  0.646  0.665  0.599 
Senegal  0.294  0.328  0.373  0.418  0.450  0.470  0.485  0.499  0.414 
Seychelles                   
Sierra Leone  0.183  0.232  0.279  0.290  0.250  0.221  0.281  0.356  0.261 
Somalia  0.251  0.275  0.298  0.338  0.325  0.329  0.390  0.409  0.327 
South Africa  0.464  0.493  0.530  0.575  0.606  0.591  0.513  0.447  0.527 
Sudan  0.357  0.383  0.408  0.432  0.459  0.491  0.518  0.538  0.448 
Swaziland  0.384  0.434  0.489  0.546  0.592  0.571  0.429  0.333  0.472 
Tanzania   0.362  0.395  0.420  0.435  0.431  0.415  0.429  0.478  0.421 
Togo  0.405  0.453  0.497  0.528  0.545  0.562  0.579  0.606  0.522 
Tunisia  0.478  0.544  0.618  0.677  0.727  0.770  0.793  0.808  0.677 
Uganda  0.414  0.432  0.417  0.414  0.382  0.339  0.355  0.421  0.397 
Western Sahara  0.284  0.337  0.411  0.485  0.543  0.583  0.627  0.666  0.492 
Zambia  0.400  0.434  0.449  0.452  0.435  0.362  0.284  0.298  0.389 
Zimbabwe  0.498  0.526  0.566  0.604  0.596  0.469  0.305  0.278  0.480 
                   
Africa   0.359  0.397  0.434  0.465  0.482  0.489  0.493  0.508  0.453 
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Table 2.4 African countries; variable GDPX in levels 
Country  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Avg. 
Algeria  0.665  0.666  0.693  0.705  0.689  0.673  0.686  0.713  0.686 
Angola  0.596  0.607  0.566  0.574  0.578  0.512  0.542  0.599  0.572 
Benin  0.402  0.400  0.408  0.420  0.402  0.407  0.425  0.429  0.412 
Botswana  0.430  0.527  0.588  0.640  0.707  0.718  0.768  0.800  0.647 
Burkina Faso  0.286  0.315  0.314  0.327  0.328  0.336  0.366  0.389  0.333 
Burundi  0.246  0.239  0.244  0.258  0.263  0.228  0.208  0.204  0.236 
Cameroon  0.434  0.468  0.501  0.551  0.506  0.467  0.485  0.497  0.489 
Cape Verde  0.442  0.447  0.410  0.462  0.472  0.495  0.531  0.550  0.476 
Central African Republic  0.385  0.387  0.373  0.367  0.347  0.332  0.333  0.311  0.354 
Chad  0.417  0.419  0.341  0.392  0.379  0.369  0.363  0.448  0.391 
Comoros  0.396  0.410  0.412  0.426  0.417  0.405  0.399  0.404  0.409 
Congo  0.512  0.548  0.562  0.617  0.590  0.572  0.578  0.593  0.572 
Congo (DRC)  0.394  0.374  0.337  0.328  0.301  0.209  0.157  0.167  0.284 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.537  0.549  0.547  0.512  0.491  0.475  0.477  0.459  0.506 
Djibouti  0.659  0.650  0.584  0.574  0.553  0.509  0.479  0.487  0.562 
Egypt  0.508  0.482  0.533  0.565  0.578  0.589  0.615  0.628  0.562 
Equatorial Guinea  0.497  0.593  0.533  0.518  0.498  0.524  0.742  0.920  0.603 
Eritrea                   
Ethiopia  0.298  0.298  0.301  0.269  0.283  0.264  0.278  0.308  0.287 
Gabon  0.806  0.840  0.858  0.853  0.836  0.835  0.816  0.813  0.832 
Gambia  0.411  0.433  0.410  0.406  0.407  0.392  0.398  0.407  0.408 
Ghana  0.382  0.376  0.382  0.350  0.366  0.377  0.392  0.414  0.380 
Guinea  0.349  0.361  0.364  0.359  0.368  0.367  0.383  0.393  0.368 
Guinea-Bissau  0.212  0.316  0.279  0.313  0.326  0.330  0.310  0.268  0.294 
Kenya  0.419  0.426  0.438  0.427  0.443  0.431  0.426  0.434  0.431 
Lesotho  0.285  0.306  0.351  0.354  0.375  0.400  0.409  0.424  0.363 
Liberia  0.487  0.477  0.479  0.439  0.263  0.069  0.262  0.196  0.334 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  0.969  0.992  1.004  0.911  0.823  0.816  0.797  0.807  0.890 
Madagascar  0.456  0.457  0.427  0.392  0.390  0.362  0.368  0.363  0.402 
Malawi  0.255  0.288  0.338  0.329  0.304  0.317  0.326  0.312  0.309 
Mali  0.345  0.339  0.366  0.326  0.337  0.339  0.359  0.385  0.349 
Mauritania  0.459  0.467  0.477  0.463  0.462  0.465  0.462  0.471  0.466 
Mauritius  0.541  0.559  0.596  0.623  0.676  0.708  0.742  0.768  0.652 
Morocco  0.480  0.503  0.529  0.536  0.555  0.548  0.567  0.598  0.539 
Mozambique  0.227  0.249  0.247  0.190  0.231  0.233  0.271  0.319  0.246 
Namibia  0.657  0.660  0.654  0.631  0.615  0.629  0.636  0.665  0.643 
Niger  0.411  0.375  0.371  0.324  0.319  0.297  0.290  0.295  0.335 
Nigeria  0.463  0.503  0.478  0.429  0.448  0.444  0.447  0.476  0.461 
Réunion                   
Rwanda  0.353  0.323  0.346  0.340  0.326  0.297  0.314  0.346  0.331 
Sao Tome and Principe  0.443  0.455  0.503  0.474  0.423  0.373  0.397  0.442  0.439 
Senegal  0.464  0.457  0.449  0.448  0.443  0.437  0.448  0.464  0.451 
Seychelles  0.675  0.718  0.783  0.781  0.820  0.831  0.869  0.861  0.792 
Sierra Leone  0.335  0.336  0.341  0.330  0.318  0.276  0.234  0.310  0.310 
Somalia                   
South Africa  0.718  0.727  0.743  0.733  0.728  0.717  0.721  0.742  0.729 
Sudan  0.395  0.401  0.386  0.365  0.380  0.400  0.431  0.463  0.403 
Swaziland  0.419  0.521  0.522  0.538  0.593  0.597  0.617  0.629  0.555 
Tanzania   0.355  0.373  0.369  0.358  0.359  0.347  0.359  0.390  0.364 
Togo  0.378  0.389  0.398  0.364  0.358  0.338  0.345  0.341  0.364 
Tunisia  0.528  0.572  0.599  0.612  0.616  0.632  0.667  0.695  0.615 
Uganda  0.357  0.352  0.299  0.277  0.288  0.316  0.344  0.367  0.325 
Western Sahara                   
Zambia  0.521  0.502  0.455  0.432  0.420  0.385  0.384  0.404  0.438 
Zimbabwe                   
                   
Africa   0.453  0.469  0.470  0.464  0.460  0.448  0.464  0.483  0.464 
 
 
Concentrating on the most current year 2005,
1
                                                           
1 Data are available for the more recent year 2007 as well, but these are not that different from those of 
2005. Hence we have opted to focus on 2005, which fits better into the half-decadal pattern of the data 
for the entire sample period. 
 we first note from table 2.1 that the Africa average is 
0.522, which is far below the averages for all other regions of the world. Indeed, the 2007-09 rankings   7 
on HDI show that most African countries fall into the bottom two deciles. Other than Mauritius 
(81/183), the only African countries that rank reasonably well on these indicators (near top half) are 
some of the Northern African countries, e.g., Libya (55/183), and Tunisia (98/183).   
 
Among African countries,  highest HDI values are enjoyed by the North African countries of Libya, 
Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt, in that order; however  Mauritius’s HDI index is only slightly less than 
Libya’s, which is the highest among all African countries. For SSA, Mauritius, South Africa and 
Botswana, in that order, enjoy the highest HDI. In the other extreme, Niger has the lowest HDIX 
value of 0.326. The average for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is 0.487, which is only 7 percent lower 
than the overall African average of 0.522 that is inclusive of North Africa. Hence, the African HD 
picture is unlikely to be much distorted by including the North African countries. Meanwhile, such 




Tables 2.1 – 2.4 further indicate that in general the components of the HDI are positively correlated 
among themselves, that is, countries with higher values of a given component tend to also exhibit 
larger values of the other components. There are differences, however.  Botswana, for instance, has 
very high HD components of EDX and GDPX of 0.772 and 0.800, respectively, but a relatively low 
value of LIFEX of 0.432, resulting in a HDIX of 0.668. While this HDI value is still quite 
respectable, especially with the African HDIX mean of 0.552, Botswana could have attained a much 
higher HDX, were it not for the relatively low LIFEX value.  To further illustrate the point, Algeria 
for instance had EDX and GDPX of 0.739 and 0.713, respectively, which were both smaller than the 
respective values for Botswana. Yet, Algeria’s HDIX was 0.743, thanks to its much higher LIFEX 
value of 0.778. If Botswana had Algeria’s LIFEX value, its HDIX would have been 0.783 instead of 
0.668.  
 
Changes in HDI 
                                                           
2 For example, in virtually all indicators of HD, except for life expectancy and the related health index 
(Figures A1 and A6, respectively), the Western region of the continent ranks last in welfare measures. 
While the reasons for this poor performance of the region are not apparent, they probably include 
institutional legacies of military and colonial regimes, geographical barriers to trade, and the nature of 
natural wealth and patterns of  its distribution.    
   8 
To study the over-time trends in the HDI, tables 3.1 - 3.4 report growth rates by country, using the 
above half-decadal data. As these statistics show, all African countries (in the sample), except for 
Zambia, have posted positive changes in HDIX since 1970.  Indeed, the mean growth rate is 5.2 
percent on a five-year basis, which translates to an annualized value of 1.0 percent.  HDIX’s growth 
rate is, however, uneven across time. It was quite strong in the 1970s (annualized rate of 1.6 percent), 
then decreased in the 1980s and early 1990s to about 0.3 percent, before rising above 1.0 percent. In 
some respect, this record mirrors that of per capita GDP growth, which also started rather strongly in 
the 1960s and 1970s, fell in the 1980s and early 1990s, resurged starting in the mid-1990s, and 
recorded an overall mean of 1.0 percent at the end of the decade (Fosu, 2010a). In any case, Africa as 
a whole has made significant progress on HDIX, which has increased from 0.366 to 0.522 between 
1970 and 2005. Furthermore, there have been considerable improvements since the mid-1990s, with 
many countries overcoming the weak performance in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Table 3.1 African countries; variable HDIX in log-differences (growth rates). % 
Country  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Avg. 
Algeria    8.482  9.456  8.162  5.300  3.491  4.883  4.974  6.393 
Angola                   
Benin    8.979  8.515  5.271  3.064  8.679  8.149  8.090  7.250 
Botswana    15.765  11.147  9.143  8.450  -0.867  -2.878  2.914  6.239 
Burkina Faso    10.676  5.821  7.583  5.272  4.311  10.895  10.615  7.882 
Burundi    3.199  6.808  13.303  5.502  2.466  9.169  7.706  6.879 
Cameroon    10.109  9.582  10.100  0.926  -2.277  0.879  3.452  4.682 
Cape Verde                   
Central African Republic    10.190  8.037  5.046  1.460  0.645  1.149  1.649  4.025 
Chad                   
Comoros                   
Congo    11.554  8.479  5.918  -1.424  -3.906  -2.051  0.660  2.747 
Congo (DRC)    4.139  2.778  2.476  -0.378  -6.280  -0.426  7.078  1.341 
Côte d'Ivoire    11.274  6.506  0.410  0.275  -1.001  5.051  1.725  3.463 
Djibouti                   
Egypt    4.330  9.894  8.608  7.157  6.267  6.228  4.447  6.704 
Equatorial Guinea                   
Eritrea                   
Ethiopia    7.243  3.856  0.315  9.890  6.241  9.661  13.452  7.237 
Gabon                   
Gambia                   
Ghana    6.094  6.184  2.167  7.257  5.921  2.352  3.284  4.751 
Guinea                   
Guinea-Bissau                   
Kenya    11.109  10.200  3.528  3.879  -1.908  -4.113  3.045  3.677 
Lesotho    7.095  10.105  6.873  13.250  7.582  -2.038  -2.894  5.710 
Liberia    7.461  8.044  1.960  -8.194  -8.775  27.839  3.413  4.535 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya    8.935  10.201  3.202  1.883  3.723  2.314  2.513  4.681 
Madagascar    7.571  5.064  -0.723  2.462  5.190  6.386  5.166  4.445 
Malawi    12.191  12.117  4.453  5.443  12.383  6.027  -0.554  7.437 
Mali    4.041  9.684  0.082  6.221  7.908  10.462  11.944  7.192 
Mauritania                   
Mauritius    3.863  4.857  4.283  4.903  3.625  3.819  3.044  4.056 
Morocco    9.099  9.630  7.011  6.673  5.100  6.168  6.899  7.226 
Mozambique    16.937  9.584  -4.382  8.769  6.999  8.635  10.780  8.189 
Namibia                   
Niger    -3.032  2.423  -3.413  3.827  3.854  8.113  23.044  4.974 
Nigeria    16.082  7.974  0.475  5.284  3.059  4.688  7.683  6.464 
Réunion                   
Rwanda    1.075  7.911  6.885  -17.474  -4.971  27.507  14.529  5.066 
Sao Tome and Principe                   
Senegal    4.880  5.447  6.914  5.425  4.268  5.057  5.909  5.415   9 
Seychelles                   
Sierra Leone                   
Somalia                   
South Africa    3.930  4.541  3.140  2.571  -0.279  -2.356  -1.369  1.454 
Sudan    7.061  4.534  4.012  7.042  6.986  7.227  6.014  6.125 
Swaziland    15.041  7.444  7.278  7.755  0.552  -5.143  -3.314  4.230 
Tanzania     12.966  9.080  2.061  0.938  -0.423  3.625  7.290  5.077 
Togo    13.343  11.381  1.671  2.679  3.882  5.672  4.881  6.216 
Tunisia    10.580  8.983  7.750  6.387  6.372  5.939  4.643  7.236 
Uganda    4.556  -2.482  1.929  2.210  6.068  10.086  8.172  4.363 
Western Sahara                   
Zambia    3.679  0.354  0.724  0.132  -7.809  -5.946  2.572  -
  Zimbabwe                   
                   
Africa     8.300  7.261  4.121  3.566  2.488  5.229  5.527  5.213 
 
 
Table 3.2  African countries; variable EDX in log-differences (growth rates). % 
Country  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Avg. 
Algeria    21.248  17.515  13.917  11.621  10.346  9.375  7.552  13.082 
Angola                   
Benin    24.439  20.621  9.340  8.542  19.801  16.203  19.640  16.941 
Botswana    17.608  14.967  13.016  11.515  6.854  6.133  2.725  10.402 
Burkina Faso    16.033  16.458  22.162  18.131  5.694  25.633  26.702  18.688 
Burundi    6.716  9.198  33.283  24.928  21.411  17.625  9.911  17.582 
Cameroon    13.364  10.475  9.590  8.750  5.331  5.061  9.216  8.827 
Cape Verde                   
Central African Republic    14.546  19.136  13.858  12.407  11.184  10.058  9.834  13.003 
Chad                   
Comoros                   
Congo    19.390  16.234  5.896  3.147  0.139  0.139  0.139  6.440 
Congo (DRC)    12.467  11.084  4.422  4.235  10.198  8.894  8.056  8.480 
Côte d'Ivoire    13.211  11.667  6.942  4.548  3.228  22.647  7.452  9.956 
Djibouti                   
Egypt    9.763  8.350  10.084  11.618  9.551  8.557  8.309  9.462 
Equatorial Guinea                   
Eritrea                   
Ethiopia    25.146  20.077  13.865  12.175  15.842  15.205  22.565  17.839 
Gabon                   
Gambia                   
Ghana    11.183  10.057  8.286  7.652  8.522  7.576  8.905  8.883 
Guinea                   
Guinea-Bissau                   
Kenya    22.241  18.183  6.708  6.287  3.300  2.523  6.722  9.424 
Lesotho    6.665  6.248  10.315  23.776  17.023  14.542  4.688  11.894 
Liberia    29.598  29.758  22.903  18.623  13.950  13.125  12.294  20.036 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya    19.572  22.079  13.628  10.341  6.566  5.260  3.920  11.623 
Madagascar    13.087  11.571  1.369  1.350  8.384  7.635  6.905  7.186 
Malawi    11.240  10.104  6.594  9.502  18.871  14.641  0.754  10.244 
Mali    13.446  16.310  10.853  9.790  25.127  23.171  23.777  17.496 
Mauritania                   
Mauritius    3.680  3.550  3.703  3.571  4.355  4.173  4.109  3.877 
Morocco    17.380  14.802  10.178  9.966  11.976  11.388  12.927  12.660 
Mozambique    27.330  21.441  6.883  6.440  6.050  4.876  16.358  12.768 
Namibia                   
Niger    11.650  10.433  11.714  10.485  17.743  15.955  74.152  21.733 
Nigeria    31.540  23.941  12.320  10.968  7.751  7.186  9.547  14.750 
Réunion                   
Rwanda    10.832  11.346  16.448  14.121  8.126  6.690  10.979  11.220 
Sao Tome and Principe                   
Senegal    9.805  8.929  13.220  12.948  12.521  11.126  12.583  11.590 
Seychelles                   
Sierra Leone                   
Somalia                   
South Africa    5.304  5.037  3.850  3.707  2.577  3.220  2.096  3.684 
Sudan    14.920  12.980  12.180  10.856  9.036  8.932  7.246  10.878 
Swaziland    10.955  10.629  7.603  5.826  4.112  3.950  3.571  6.664 
Tanzania     25.868  20.533  4.482  2.962  4.298  4.121  3.868  9.447 
Togo    33.852  25.245  6.253  5.885  12.448  11.069  9.100  14.836 
Tunisia    11.152  10.032  12.891  11.795  11.123  10.009  8.112  10.731 
Uganda    11.641  10.426  11.260  10.119  16.362  14.130  3.977  11.131 
Western Sahara                   
Zambia    7.533  7.005  5.431  5.151  -0.144  -0.090  -0.088  3.542 
Zimbabwe    8.775  8.066  8.693  7.139  -0.123  1.757  1.478  5.112   10 
                   
Africa     15.644  14.014  10.671  9.747  9.709  9.792  10.558  11.448 
 
 
Table 3.3 African countries; variable LIFEX log-differences (growth rates). % 
Country  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Avg. 
Algeria    11.200  10.302  11.086  8.209  3.440  3.637  3.531  7.343 
Angola    16.056  9.860  4.095  4.761  4.094  4.744  10.039  7.664 
Benin    12.832  9.394  5.337  6.815  8.441  6.059  5.344  7.746 
Botswana    10.095  8.103  6.311  3.818  -12.123  -30.392  1.047  -1.877 
Burkina Faso    10.311  8.797  6.407  5.266  5.552  6.809  6.560  7.100 
Burundi    5.642  9.086  6.192  -8.047  -6.829  9.326  9.780  3.593 
Cameroon    10.077  11.874  11.300  2.969  -5.080  -7.516  -3.453  2.882 
Cape Verde    6.725  7.988  6.656  4.881  3.929  3.259  3.442  5.269 
Central African Republic    19.384  12.830  4.916  -1.268  -4.893  -7.727  -1.175  3.152 
Chad    8.548  8.521  8.446  3.494  -2.043  -5.524  -3.433  2.573 
Comoros    9.563  7.548  6.914  8.427  8.942  6.967  5.876  7.748 
Congo    9.370  6.848  2.399  -3.386  -9.709  -8.418  -1.055  -0.565 
Congo (DRC)    6.477  6.737  4.903  0.970  -6.808  0.235  5.869  2.626 
Côte d'Ivoire    21.922  11.315  3.399  1.812  -1.592  -4.307  1.596  4.878 
Djibouti    11.534  9.810  7.547  5.862  6.304  3.817  3.068  6.849 
Egypt    10.544  11.037  10.082  8.187  7.371  5.784  2.962  7.995 
Equatorial Guinea    9.685  9.167  9.933  10.006  7.016  1.785  2.290  7.126 
Eritrea    6.505  -2.488  3.962  15.271  16.639  12.626  7.561  8.582 
Ethiopia    6.896  -1.627  2.869  12.138  9.589  8.825  8.562  6.750 
Gabon    16.339  14.177  13.400  7.111  0.387  -3.850  -1.269  6.614 
Gambia    16.992  15.407  11.871  7.938  5.312  4.562  4.064  9.449 
Ghana    9.001  6.981  5.078  8.916  5.580  -3.523  -4.252  3.969 
Guinea    13.212  13.739  11.406  11.317  9.894  9.570  9.894  11.290 
Guinea-Bissau    9.754  12.034  14.059  7.448  4.420  5.829  5.189  8.390 
Kenya    9.778  8.754  4.953  1.416  -7.045  -15.456  -1.302  0.157 
Lesotho    7.420  10.694  8.327  9.214  -1.350  -28.405  -25.019  -2.731 
Liberia    10.304  4.713  -1.068  5.017  11.561  10.975  8.463  7.138 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya    12.849  15.128  12.430  8.246  5.783  4.038  2.322  8.685 
Madagascar    10.041  10.474  4.564  6.516  11.572  8.266  7.399  8.405 
Malawi    13.337  10.811  8.697  11.650  10.322  -3.516  0.269  7.367 
Mali    8.721  9.631  9.935  8.041  6.405  7.336  7.960  8.290 
Mauritania    9.310  10.745  7.044  3.181  1.906  0.797  -0.254  4.675 
Mauritius    4.494  4.792  4.737  3.309  2.014  2.581  1.542  3.353 
Morocco    9.442  11.294  10.368  7.568  6.174  4.949  3.904  7.671 
Mozambique    15.284  7.100  -0.338  3.707  12.638  8.089  0.044  6.646 
Namibia    9.115  8.535  6.562  5.755  1.759  -11.376  -0.505  2.835 
Niger    4.027  5.268  6.185  8.014  10.824  14.501  14.173  8.999 
Nigeria    14.566  10.559  0.656  -1.724  0.764  5.913  6.349  5.297 
Réunion    8.505  6.627  5.435  4.178  2.942  1.888  1.677  4.464 
Rwanda    1.788  5.564  4.266  -
 
-62.650  148.249  25.768  2.690 
Sao Tome and Principe    6.507  5.878  4.504  3.270  1.912  1.979  2.897  3.850 
Senegal    11.164  12.850  11.266  7.530  4.239  3.074  2.882  7.572 
Seychelles                   
Sierra Leone    23.672  18.711  3.690  -14.918  -12.423  24.364  23.586  9.526 
Somalia    9.077  8.265  12.483  -3.871  1.071  16.982  4.885  6.985 
South Africa    6.067  7.273  8.210  5.277  -2.590  -14.158  -13.814  -0.534 
Sudan    7.170  6.364  5.714  6.060  6.635  5.357  3.915  5.888 
Swaziland    12.332  11.936  11.121  8.056  -3.669  -28.525  -25.320  -2.010 
Tanzania     8.862  6.177  3.546  -0.962  -3.741  3.238  10.711  3.976 
Togo    11.090  9.380  6.051  3.230  2.981  3.067  4.500  5.757 
Tunisia    12.930  12.642  9.224  7.124  5.702  2.923  1.875  7.488 
Uganda    4.179  -3.377  -0.721  -8.169  -11.898  4.659  16.965  0.234 
Western Sahara    17.021  20.040  16.584  11.135  7.200  7.276  6.034  12.184 
Zambia    8.238  3.322  0.629  -3.683  -18.585  -24.129  4.812  -4.199 
Zimbabwe    5.600  7.266  6.553  -1.389  -23.999  -42.884  -9.378  -8.319 
                   
Africa     10.399  8.979  6.855  2.436  0.450  2.678  3.137  4.991 
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Table 3.4 African countries; variable GDPX in log-differences (growth rates). % 
Country  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  Avg. 
Algeria    0.156  4.037  1.766  -2.315  -2.420  1.913  3.928  1.009 
Angola    1.777  -6.941  1.335  0.750  -12.149  5.692  9.978  0.063 
Benin    -0.406  1.893  3.018  -4.414  1.275  4.366  0.916  0.950 
Botswana    20.363  10.963  8.479  10.030  1.463  6.775  4.120  8.885 
Burkina Faso    9.721  -0.100  4.096  0.270  2.276  8.582  5.986  4.404 
Burundi    -2.513  1.714  5.713  2.008  -14.235  -9.194  -1.880  -2.627 
Cameroon    7.432  6.865  9.502  -8.558  -8.045  3.899  2.277  1.910 
Cape Verde    1.102  -8.526  11.812  2.311  4.712  6.906  3.539  3.122 
Central African Republic    0.445  -3.695  -1.654  -5.467  -4.340  0.080  -6.747  -3.054 
Chad    0.561  -20.574  13.687  -3.179  -2.678  -1.837  21.251  1.033 
Comoros    3.518  0.576  3.147  -2.065  -2.980  -1.378  1.301  0.303 
Congo    6.803  2.360  9.430  -4.449  -3.063  0.936  2.637  2.094 
Congo (DRC)    -5.403  -10.262  -2.684  -8.490  -36.666  -28.572  6.374  -12.243 
Côte d'Ivoire    2.333  -0.475  -6.471  -4.243  -3.433  0.410  -3.843  -2.246 
Djibouti    -1.392  -10.682  -1.770  -3.762  -8.330  -6.056  1.701  -4.327 
Egypt    -5.353  10.007  5.924  2.189  1.920  4.407  2.112  3.029 
Equatorial Guinea    17.648  -10.548  -2.928  -4.026  5.197  34.813  21.460  8.802 
Eritrea                   
Ethiopia    0.017  1.101  -11.476  5.315  -7.074  5.090  10.341  0.473 
Gabon    4.083  2.122  -0.553  -1.969  -0.117  -2.339  -0.378  0.121 
Gambia    5.213  -5.548  -0.880  0.119  -3.677  1.585  2.022  -0.167 
Ghana    -1.620  1.404  -8.518  4.387  3.053  3.778  5.407  1.127 
Guinea    3.406  0.979  -1.372  2.361  -0.221  4.170  2.773  1.728 
Guinea-Bissau    39.614  -12.485  11.686  4.044  1.251  -6.336  -14.587  3.313 
Kenya    1.789  2.660  -2.497  3.782  -2.909  -1.003  1.832  0.522 
Lesotho    7.137  13.593  0.929  5.668  6.578  2.159  3.478  5.649 




-29.308  -13.044 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya    2.365  1.192  -9.709  -10.171  -0.838  -2.370  1.176  -2.622 
Madagascar    0.340  -6.920  -8.606  -0.292  -7.463  1.651  -1.367  -3.237 
Malawi    12.227  15.904  -2.619  -7.845  4.332  2.611  -4.400  2.887 
Mali    -1.592  7.619  -11.411  3.114  0.668  5.590  7.114  1.586 
Mauritania    1.835  2.150  -3.143  -0.207  0.770  -0.606  1.914  0.388 
Mauritius    3.346  6.423  4.413  8.138  4.581  4.745  3.459  5.015 
Morocco    4.565  5.027  1.419  3.424  -1.326  3.403  5.326  3.120 
Mozambique    9.250  -0.760  -26.436  19.821  0.537  15.153  16.498  4.866 
Namibia    0.512  -0.966  -3.636  -2.516  2.216  1.229  4.331  0.167 
Niger    -9.399  -0.869  -13.692  -1.452  -7.319  -2.306  1.628  -4.773 
Nigeria    8.338  -5.223  -10.780  4.348  -0.773  0.593  6.241  0.392 
Réunion                   
Rwanda    -8.668  6.687  -1.623  -4.239  -9.440  5.749  9.466  -0.295 
Sao Tome and Principe    2.730  10.024  -5.985  -11.371  -12.563  6.125  10.874  -0.024 
Senegal    -1.391  -1.880  -0.202  -1.121  -1.374  2.529  3.567  0.018 
Seychelles    6.112  8.688  -0.216  4.792  1.358  4.465  -0.966  3.462 
Sierra Leone    0.296  1.429  -3.393  -3.531  -14.267  -16.295  27.906  -1.122 
Somalia                   
South Africa    1.262  2.173  -1.348  -0.790  -1.447  0.462  2.877  0.456 
Sudan    1.611  -3.994  -5.589  4.154  5.111  7.530  7.062  2.269 
Swaziland    21.739  0.103  3.161  9.662  0.605  3.349  1.936  5.793 
Tanzania     5.026  -1.122  -2.959  0.354  -3.518  3.311  8.403  1.357 
Togo    2.853  2.290  -8.817  -1.742  -5.633  2.124  -1.256  -1.454 
Tunisia    8.000  4.593  2.115  0.780  2.559  5.342  4.134  3.932 
Uganda    -1.671  -16.159  -7.721  3.879  9.497  8.255  6.550  0.376 
Western Sahara                   
Zambia    -3.747  -9.758  -5.161  -2.900  -8.795  -0.048  5.026  -3.626 
Zimbabwe                   
                   
Africa     3.604  -0.049  -1.621  -0.929  -5.233  4.711  3.684  0.595 
 
 
Examining the growth of the components of HDIX, we note that EDX’s growth for Africa as a whole 
varied relatively little, though as with the case of per capita GDP growth, it began rather strongly at 
about an annualized rate of 3.0 percent in the 1970s and fell to approximately 2.0 percent thereafter. 
Overall Africa’s EDX increased from 0.300 in 1970 to 0.607 in 2005, with an average annualized 
growth rate of 1.3 percent.    12 
Similarly, LIFEX began at an annualized high growth rate of about 1.9 percent in the 1970s, but then 
declined; by 1995, it had reached a nadir of less than 0.1 percent. Since the mid-1990s, however, it 
has increased steadily.  Though the growth rate remains substantially lower than that in the 1970s, it 
is substantially higher than that in the early 1990s. In any case, overall LIFEX for Africa increased 
from 0.359 to 0.508 between 1970 and 2005, with an annualized average of 1.0 percent. 
 
Some regional and country differences  
There are, of course, regional and country differences in the observed African pattern of HDI trends.  
In particular, Zambia seems like a special case, as it is the lone African country in the sample that 
registered negative growth in HDIX between 1970 and 2005, during which time its HDIX fell from 
0.465 to 0.437. The country’s HDIX grew relatively strongly in the early 1970s (though still at less 
than 1.0 percent annually) but stagnated pretty much thereafter, declining hugely in the 1990s, before 
eking out a small increase in the early 21
st century.  To better understand the poor performance of the 
Zambian HDIX, it is important to examine each of its components. 
 
Zambia performs rather strongly on EDX in the 1970s and 1980s. Then, the bottom falls out starting 
from the early 1990s, though there was a slightly positive EDX contribution over the whole 1970-
2005 period of 0.7 percent per year.   
 
Similarly on LIFEX, Zambia began rather admirably in the early 1970s with a strong growth of 2.7 
percent annually; then, the growth in life expectancy continued to decrease over the years, with actual 
declines in LIFEX beginning in the latter parts of the 1980s. The declines actually worsened 
increasingly until the beginning of the 21
st century when LIFEX rose at an annualized rate of nearly 
1.0 percent. During the overall 1970-2005 period, LIFEX fell by 0.8 percent on an annual basis. 
 
Zambia did not perform well on GDPX either, which fell considerably during the 1970s, by about 1.5 
percent per year, a record that differs significantly from that in most African countries, which grew 
relatively strongly in the 1970s. Zambia’s GDPX continued to decrease throughout the period 
analyzed until about 2000; it posted an increase of 1.0 percent per year between 2000 and 2005. Over 
the entire 1970-2005 period, however, GDPX decreased by an annual average of 0.7 percent. 
   13 
In effect, Zambia’s poor performance on HDIX can be attributable to all the three components: EDX, 
LIFEX and GDPX, though the latter two seem to be the main culprits. Of course, all three 
components are likely to be correlated among themselves. However, the country’s hugely poor 
performance on LIFEX in the latter part of the 1980s and in the1990s is particularly noteworthy.  
Although GDPX had been falling all along, LIFEX continued to improve through the 1970s until the 
mid-1980s, when the bottom began to fall out.  It is now generally accepted that the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS constituted a health shock in southern Africa generally, and in Zambia in particular, which 
may have in turn even further contributed to the downward slide of GDPX in Zambia. According to 
UNAIDS, Zambia’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate has been historically high,  registering about 17 
percent in 2003 (UNAIDS, 2006), compared with a median (mean) of 4 percent (8 percent) for SSA.  
 
With the first case documented in 1984, HIV/AIDS has been a major problem in Zambia since 
especially the latter part of the 1980s and in the1990s. Thanks mainly to AIDS, life expectancy of the 
country reached a minimum of 42 years by 2000, from a high of 52 years in the mid-1980s. It may 
have also contributed to the subsequent GDPX declines noted above. Zambia’s story, however, 
appears to have begun in the 1970s when the price of copper, Zambia’s main export earner and GDP 
booster, fell substantially, reducing economic prospects in the country.  Such an economic shock in 
turn compelled a large number of Zambian men to emigrate and work elsewhere in southern Africa. 
The migrants are generally associated with multiple sexual partners, and such behavior is believed to 




 weakening the capacity of households and governments in the region to 
treat AIDS patients and to care for AIDS orphans. Azemar and Desbordes (2009) also find that the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS, as well as malaria, tends to weaken public governance and, hence, to reduce 
foreign direct investment in SSA.      
The HIV/AIDS saga is essentially a southern African problem, rather than Zambia’s per se. It 
exemplifies the greater interconnectedness of the sub-region, especially intra-migration and cultural 
practices regarding multiple partners that have helped spread HIV/AIDS. That sub-region is the most 
affected by the disease, with Swaziland, for instance, exhibiting a prevalence rate of 31 percent, 
                                                           
3 It can also weaken traditional social support systems, such as extended-family based risk pooling 
mechanisms.   14 
followed by Botswana (28 percent), Lesotho (24 percent), Zimbabwe (23 percent), South Africa (18 
percent), and then Namibia and Zambia (17 percent each).   
 
Indeed, as discussed above, despite its stellar performance on the economic growth front, Botswana’s 
performance on the HDIX has been less than impressive, thanks to the underperformance on LIFEX.  
The country’s life expectancy dropped from 64 years in the mid-1980s to 51 years by 2000. This fall 
is even faster than Zambia’s and much of it may have resulted from Botswana’s high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate and equally high economic inequalities that could have led to excessive infant 
mortality rates in some parts of the country.  Actually, the slowdown in Botswana’s GDP growth in 
the1990s has been attributed not only to the deterioration in its terms of trade due to the fall in 
diamond prices but also to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Fosu and Aryeetey, 2009).  
 
Although Zambia performed the worst in terms of the evolution of HDI, Congo (DRC) and South 
Africa were not far behind with HDIX mean annual growth rates of 0.3 percent each during 1970-
2005.  In some sense, some of the low performance of South Africa could be traced to the fact that its 
level of HDI was already high at the initial period; indeed, among African countries, it had the highest 
HDIX value of 0.61 in 1970 (table 2.1). Hence, its rate of increase could be expected to be less as 
HDIX approached its 1.00 limit. For example, in 1970, South Africa enjoyed the highest level of 
EDX among African countries (table 2.2) and grew at a similar rate (less than 1.0 percent) as 
Mauritius, which had only a slightly less EDX value than South Africa’s. This performance was less 
than the overall Africa’s average of 2.3 percent. Nonetheless, the statistical artifact is not the entire 
explanation.  While the country’s EDX grew respectably, LIFEX fell, much of this drop occurring 





Nor is the falling life expectancy the only explanation for the poor performance of South Africa on 
HD, though.  As in many other African countries, the country’s GDPX actually declined during the 
1980s and early-1990s.  When Africa as a whole recovered economically as of the latter 1990s with 
                                                           
4 Prior to the 1990s when the disease became a major problem, LIFEX grew reasonably well as 
compared with the rest of Africa; however, LIFEX has since diverged downward, ending up with a 
1970-2005 mean growth rate of about -0.0 percent, compared with the overall Africa’s mean of 1.0 
percent.   15 
an average annual growth rate of nearly 1.0 percent, however, South Africa eked out a rate of 0.1 
percent. While this relatively weak economic performance could be attributable in part to HIV/AIDS, 
a considerable portion could  also be traced to political uncertainties accompanying the end of 
apartheid in 1994 (Fosu and  Aryeetey, 2009). South Africa’s GDPX growth recovered strongly 
during 2000-05 (table 3.4), however, when the uncertainties might have subsided with time. Thus, the 
potentially EDX ‘statistical-artifact’ story, HIV/AIDS, and political uncertainties, particularly the 
ones associated with the apartheid system, all appear to have conspired to hand South Africa a rather 
minimal growth in HDI during 1970-2005.  
 
As indicated above, Congo (DRC) also performed rather poorly on HDI during 1970-2005.  While the 
country exhibited a reasonable annual EDX growth rate of nearly 2.0 percent, and LIFEX grew by 0.5 
percent, the main culprit appears to be the dismal performance on GDPX, which fell by 2.4 percent 
annually (table 3.4).  This situation may be attributable to a combination of poor governance and 
political instability.  The economic performance of former Belgian Congo was poor right in the early 
1960s following independence, thanks to the political instability as the leaders (Prime Minister 
Lumumba and President Kasavubu) rivaled for power.  Joseph Mobutu seized power in 1965, 
declared himself President, and ruled the country with an iron hand until his forced departure in 1997 
via rebel action.  Nor have successive governments so far succeeded in improving governance. 
Indeed, DRC ranks right at the bottom of African countries in terms of executive constraint, with a 
score of 1.0 or less out of a possible maximum score of 7.0 throughout its history. Since the mid-
1990s following Mobutu’s overthrow, furthermore, the country has received the score of 0.0, 
indicating ‘perfect incoherence’ (source: Polity IV Project, 2007). This low value of executive 
restraint tends to be growth-inhibiting (Alence, 2004; Fosu, 2009c).  Although deterioration in the 
international terms of trade in the 1980s due to the decline in the price of cobalt contributed to the 
substantial GDP reductions then, DRC has enjoyed favorable terms of trade overall during 1981-
2005. Hence, the continued declines in GDX cannot be blamed on such international price factors. 
Instead, Mobutu is believed to have looted the country dry (Collier and O’Connell, 2008), thanks to 
the low level of executive restraint.   In sum, therefore, DRC’s poor performance is traceable to a 
combination of political instability and governance. The real challenge, then, is how to fix that.   
   16 
Nonetheless, many African countries succeeded in raising the levels of their HDI quite considerably. 





Mozambique’s performance is particularly noteworthy, since it is also in southern Africa and has had 
a considerable exposure to HIV/AIDS, with a prevalence rate of 14 percent.  Despite this, the country 
registered a fairly strong growth in LIFEX over the entire 1970-2005 period of more that 1.3 percent 
per year, and above the African average.  This success is likely attributable to active policies, as 
exemplified in the following statement from  the country’s development program (Mozambique, 
1999):  
 
“The government's strategy for the health sector focuses on increasing access to health care and 
improving the quality of services through the rehabilitation and construction of first-level care 
facilities and rural hospitals, and the provision of adequate medical supplies.”  
 
Mozambique’s lowest growth, among the HDIX components, during 1970-2005 was in GDPX, which 
increased by 1.0 percent per year, while EDX grew by nearly 3.0 percent.  This relatively low growth 
of GDPX resulted in great part from its precipitous drop of 5.0 percent at an annual rate in the early 
1980s, in part because of a substantial decline in the terms of trade of about 2.0 percent per year, but 
also by the raging civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO as of 1977 following Mozambique’s 
independence of 1975. On the positive side, however, the apparently strong growth in education 
should bode well for the future as it contributes to a solid foundation for the country’s development.  
 
Nevertheless, Mozambique’s GDPX growth during the post-war starting in 1992 has been quite 
remarkable. During 1995-2005, GDPX grew by more than 3.0 percent per year, compared with less 
than 1.0 percent in Africa as a whole (table 3.4).  What accounts for this spectacular record, especially 
given that Mozambique actually experienced deterioration in its international terms of trade during   17 
1991-2005 of about 0.5 percent per year?
5
“Mozambique emerged in 1992 from a protracted civil war with over one-fourth of its population 
displaced and some of the poorest social indicators in sub-Saharan Africa. Over the subsequent three 
years, with generous assistance from the international community, the government successfully 
steered the resettlement and economic reintegration of the displaced population, the demobilization of 
80,000 troops, and the return to democracy. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 
November 1994, and the next general elections are scheduled for late 1999. While the economic 
recovery has been strong in recent years, income per capita is still low by international standards, 
making further strong growth and poverty reduction the overarching goals of economic policy. ” 
  One factor might be the rebound phenomenon, as 
resources could now be used more fully and efficiently following the end of the war.  For the growth 
to be sustained, however, a more fertile environment was required. The strategy was reflected in the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) document of 1999, for instance, setting out the 
government’s objectives and policies for 1999-2002 (Mozambique, 1999), which states: 
6
During this post-war period, Mozambique conducted credible multi-party elections, with its index of 
electoral competitiveness rising from less than 4.0 during the pre-1990s to the upper limit of 7.0 since 
1995 (Fosu, 2009b). Meanwhile, the degree of constraint on the executive branch of government 
increased from less than 3.0 before the 1990s to 4.0 as of the mid-1990s (ibid.). Thus, in addition to 
engaging in economic liberalization and adjustment as part of ESAF, the country succeeded in 
favorably reforming its political environment. There was apparently sufficient progress to merit a 
‘syndrome-free’ categorization for 1992-2005 (Collier and O’Connell, 2008), which must have 





                                                           
5 Computed by authors using data from World Bank (2007). Note that all references to terms of trade 
throughout the paper pertain to data from this source.  
6Mozambique launched a structural adjustment program in 1987, supported by a Structural Adjustment 
Facility (SAF) arrangement until 1990, by an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) 
arrangement until 1995, and by a second ESAF-supported arrangement until mid-1999. (Mozambique 
and IMF, 1999). 
  
7 By ‘syndrome-free’ regime it is meant a politically stable state with reasonably market-friendly 
policies, which is viewed to be growth-enhancing (Fosu and O’Connell, 2006). The economic-growth 
importance of this regime is further elaborated below.   18 
The role of external aid in the form of World Bank lending and ODA as an integral part of the 
structural-adjustment program cannot be underestimated either. In support of the structural reforms, 
the World Bank approved six adjustment lending operations, while donor support was substantial 
(Mozambique and IMF, 1999). Even during the 2000-07 period, more than one quarter (27.9 percent) 
of Mozambique’s gross national income came from ODA (AU/ECA, 2009; table 7). Coupled with a 
favorable policy and governance framework, external assistance has apparently succeeded in 
contributing to the observed progress in HD. 
 
Burkina Faso 
Burkina Faso increased its HDIX by an average of 1.6 percent annually during 1970-2005, the second 
highest in Africa, as indicated above. Burkina Faso’s strong performance on HDI results from 
relatively high growth on each of the three components of the index, scoring well above the African 
average on all of them, and especially on GDPX, which grew by nearly 1.0 percent annually 
compared with the African average of 0.1 percent.  Much of this favorable GDPX growth occurred in 
the 1990s, following economic reforms as part of the structural adjustment program (SAP) with the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) that was launched in 1991.
8 Subsequently, Burkina Faso achieved 
a syndrome-free regime, which was presumably conducive to growth (Collier and O’Connell, 2008; 
Fosu and O’Connell, 2006). Indeed, it is remarkable that the country achieved an annual GDPX 
growth rate of 1.2 percent during 1990-2005, compared with an increase of only 0.2 percent for 




The countries with the strongest performance in HDI were not necessarily those with the highest level 
of HDIX initially in 1970 (or in 2005). Instead, nearly all the top six, for instance, were below the 
African average. Hence, such a performance may be viewed as one of convergence.
10
                                                           
8 Based on the synthesis of a large number of country cases, Fosu (2008a) argues quite strongly that it 
is such economic exigencies, along with external pressure as part of the BWI-administered reform 
packages, which pushed many African countries toward the syndrome-free regime of the 1980s and 
90s.   
   
9 The average terms of trade for Africa increased slightly during this period (author’s computation 
using data from World Bank, 2007).  
10 From a cynical perspective, it may also be viewed as a statistical artifact, since the denominator 
would be relatively small and would thus tend to inflate the growth rate. It should also be noted that 
there were high HDIX-growth performers among several relatively high-HDI countries as well: e.g., 
Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, and Tunisia, though among these only Botswana is in SSA.   19 
 
Poverty 
Poverty represents another (negative) measure of social well-being, with its reduction being an 
indicator of improvement in HD. Table 4 sheds light on SSA’s poverty-reduction performance in a 
global context, by presenting over-time trends in poverty by the major world regions: East Asia and 
the Pacific (EAP), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SAS), and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 





We make the following observations from table 4. First, in 2005, SSA exhibited the largest poverty at 
the $1.25 level, as measured by the headcount ratio; at the $2.50 standard, however, SAS had the 
highest poverty rate, with SSA second with 4 percentage points less.  Second, poverty reduction over 
the entire 1981-2005 in SSA is rather minimal; the region has exhibited the least progress on poverty 
over the entire period.
12 Third, there is, however, a change in the over-time pattern. While poverty 
increased in SSA during 1981-96, it declined in 1996-2005. The rate of decrease in the latter sub-




  These results suggest, then, that SSA has been making progress on the poverty front 
since the mid-1990s, notwithstanding its dismal poverty record in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
   
                                                           
11 The $1.25 and $2.50 poverty standards currently represent, respectively, the previous $1 and $2 
ones; see Chen and Ravallion (2008) and Ravallion et al. (2009). 
12 An exception is EECA at the $1.25 level where there is considerable increase in the poverty rate in 
this sub-period; however, this region had very minimal poverty, to begin with. 
13 The rate of poverty reduction is lowest in MENA for the $1.25 level. Note also that in level changes, 
poverty reduction is about the same for MENA, SAS and SSA.   20 
Table 4. Trends in Poverty ($1.25 and $2.50 headcount ratios), SSA vs. Other Regions, 1981-2005 
 
  Level (%)  Mean annual change (%)  Mean annual log-difference (%)  
                   
Growth 
Rate         


















8    -2.78    -2.14      -5.13    -8.48     





4  8.22    -0.13    -0.30      -1.08    -3.18     














1    0.36    -0.87      0.64    -1.60     
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0    0.22    -0.43      0.27    -0.52     
 
Notes:  East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SAS), and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
[Source: Adapted from Fosu (2010b), which uses data from World Bank (2009a)] 
 
 
What has been the record of growth and how has it been translated to poverty reduction? Table 5 
presents the evidence for the six regions and for the two sub-periods: 1981-95 and 1996-2005.  These 
results imply that SSA’s rise in poverty in the earlier sub-period was associated with a decline in per-
capita GDP during that period. Conversely, the reduction in SSA’s poverty since the mid-1990s has 
been accompanied by growth resurgence. Associated with a one percent mean annual per-capita GDP 
reduction in 1981-95 was a corresponding increase in poverty of 0.64 percent and 0.27 percent per 
annum, respectively, at the $1.25 and $2.50 poverty levels. For 1981-2005, an annual mean GDP   21 
growth of 1.29 percent was translated to poverty reduction of 1.60 percent and 0.52 percent annually, 
respectively. As observed elsewhere, however, the rate of transforming growth to poverty reduction in 
SSA would have been greater if the level of income inequality and or income had been larger (Fosu, 
2009a, 2010b).  
Table 5: Per capita GDP growth vs. poverty reduction by region, 1981- 2005  
     P.C GDP growth    $1.25 P0 growth    $2.50 P0 growth 




05  1981-96  1996-05  1981-96  1996-05 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP)  6.894  6.355  -5.126  -8.481  -1.616  -4.331 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA)  -3.434  4.138  6.769  -2.594  1.229  -3.911 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)  0.140  1.394  -1.083  -3.176  -0.605  -2.538 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)  0.713  2.309  -4.347  -1.445  -1.215  -1.484 
South Asia (SAS)  3.208  4.143  -1.548  -1.710  -0.296  -0.530 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  -1.009  1.293  0.644  -1.597  0.270  -0.517 
 
Notes: All figures are annual averages and are in percent.  P.C. GDP growth rates are calculated from 
World Bank (2009b) as averages of annual regional values.  P0 is the headcount ratio and its growth 
rate is annualized: calculated as the logarithmic difference (dlogP0) of ending-year value and 
beginning-year value, divided by the number of years between the two years, x 100 percent , based on 
data from World Bank (2009a) [Source: Adapted from Fosu (2010b)]. 
 
Country evidence 
Poverty data by country are rather scant. World Bank (2009a) represents the source of cross-country 
comparable data. Unfortunately, much of this data is unavailable for a large number of African 
countries, especially for the earlier sub-period. Consequently, we limit our country analysis to the 
latter sub-period when comparable data are available for a reasonable number of countries in the 
region. To include as many African economies as possible, we use 1990-96 as the starting period and 
choose a beginning year as that closest to 1996 with data. The end period is the latest year in the 21
st 
century for which there is data. Hence, only countries with data within 1990-96 and 2000-present are 
included. The latest available rates of poverty by country, as well as the growth rates of GDP per 
capita, income per capita,
14
 
 poverty rates at the $1.25 and $1.50 levels, and of income inequality (Gini 
coefficient) are reported in table 6.   
                                                           
14 By ‘income’ we mean the private consumption part of GDP; for details, see Chen and Ravallion 
(2008).     22 
Table 6. Headcount poverty ratio P0, and growths of PC GDP, Income, P0, early-mid-1990s to latest available-
data year in 2000-present 
 





















Faso  SSA  2003  56.54  88.27    3.182  1.536  -2.557 
-
0.251  -2.748 
Burundi  SSA  2006  81.32  96.12    -2.532  0.756  -0.252 
-
0.091  -0.013 
Cameroon  SSA  2001  32.81  68.84    1.694  5.792  -9.001 
-
3.598  -0.989 
CAR  SSA  2003  62.43  88.05    -0.699  5.060  -2.823 
-
0.585  -3.419 
Côte d'Ivoire  SSA  2002  23.34  58.56    -0.145  3.168  1.448 
-
0.799  3.958 
Djibouti  MENA  2002  18.84  54.19    -1.643  -7.937  22.929 
13.64
4  1.387 
Egypt  MENA  2004  1.99  35.51    2.494  1.552  -2.356 
-
2.757  0.718 
Ethiopia  SSA  2005  39.04  87.96    2.706  1.244  -4.384 
-
0.329  -2.947 
Ghana  SSA  2005  29.99  65.60    2.211  3.340  -3.802 
-
1.934  0.819 
Guinea  SSA  2003  70.13  91.86    1.585  -1.628  -0.722  0.367  -3.309 
Guinea-
Bissau  SSA  2002  48.83  86.68    -2.205  -6.242  7.174  2.170  0.808 
Kenya  SSA  2005  19.72  51.06    0.340  3.376  -3.364 
-
2.337  1.134 
Lesotho  SSA  2002  43.41  70.81    2.503  -3.671  -1.313  0.728  -2.641 
Madagascar  SSA  2005  67.83  94.83    0.126  1.755  -0.554  0.193  0.200 
Mali  SSA  2001  51.43  85.38    2.879  6.005  -4.292 
-
0.971  -2.165 
Mauritania  SSA  2000  21.16  56.79    0.995  2.321  -2.012 
-
1.784  0.917 
Morocco  MENA  2007  2.50  24.38    2.088  0.222  0.119 
-
0.437  0.247 
Mozambique  SSA  2002  74.69  93.91    4.813  3.647  -1.422 
-
0.299  0.954 
Niger  SSA  2005  65.88  90.92    -0.139  2.827  -1.555 
-
0.417  0.502 
Nigeria  SSA  2003  64.41  89.70    1.743  0.040  -0.882 
-
0.260  -1.141 
Senegal  SSA  2005  33.50  72.35    1.778  2.694  -4.359 
-
1.676  -0.507 
South Africa  SSA  2000  26.20  50.73    1.434  -0.584  4.019  0.870  0.413 
Swaziland  SSA  2000  62.85  86.97    1.046  5.255  -3.725 
-
1.051  -2.993 
Tanzania  SSA  2000  88.52  98.16    2.546  -4.282  2.204  0.346  0.256 
Tunisia  MENA  2000  2.55  21.05    3.564  3.371  -18.653 
-
6.878  -0.412 
Uganda  SSA  2005  51.53  83.72    3.580  3.115  -2.475 
-
0.982  1.532 
Zambia  SSA  2004  64.29  87.26    0.980  -0.830  0.439  0.046  0.236 
                       23 
 
Notes: Headcount ratio P0 values are for the latest year (‘present’) for which data are available (in parentheses). 
Data are annual or annualized averages and in percent.  Per-capita (PC) GDP growth rates are 1995-2005 
means of annual values from World Bank (2009b).  Growth rates of P0, Mean Income and Gini are calculated 
by the author as the log-differences using present and start-year (most recent in 1990-96) values, divided by the 
number of years between the two periods, x 100 percent, using data from World Bank, 2009a. Note that 
income refers to the consumption component of GDP and, thus, better reflects household income that is likely 
to be better linked, relative to GDP, with poverty. [Source: Adapted from Fosu (2010b)] 
 
We note that most of the African countries shown in table 6 have experienced appreciable poverty 
reduction since the 1990s. At the $1.25 level, the leading countries in this regard are: Tunisia, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mali, Ghana, Swaziland, and Kenya, in that order. At the $2.50 standard, the 
ordered list is: Tunisia, Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, and Ghana. In contrast, those countries 
experiencing appreciable poverty increases include: at the $1.25 standard, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, 
South Africa, Tanzania, and Cote d’Ivoire; and at the $2.50 level, Djibouti and Guinea-Bissau.  
Furthermore, the poverty-reducing countries tend to also experience significant income growth, and 
conversely.  In certain cases, income growth was accompanied by appreciable declines in income 
inequality (Burkina Faso, CAR, Ethiopia, Mali, and Swaziland).  Conversely, increasing inequality 
may have thwarted the efforts of income growth in certain cases, including: Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Kenya and Uganda.   
 
In many instances, furthermore, income growth poorly reflects GDP growth. For example, Guinea, 
Lesotho, South Africa, and Tanzania exhibit positive per-capita GDP growth but negative per-capita 
income growth. In contrast, in the following countries per-capita income increased despite decreases 
in per-capita GDP: CAR, Cote d’Ivoire, and Niger. The above observations then suggest that both 
income growth and changing income inequality may have important implications for poverty 
reduction, while per-capita GDP growth may poorly reflect per-capita income growth, with the latter 




Roles of growth and equity in poverty reduction – a quantitative assessment  
                                                           
15 See Fosu (2010b) for a further elaboration of these relationships for a global sample.    24 
The above results are suggestive, that is, income growth tends to reduce poverty while increases in 
(income) inequality tend to raise it. The traditional hypothesis is that growth is the main driver of 
poverty reduction. Indeed, Dollar and Kraay (2002) argue that income distribution empirically plays 
no special role in the transmission of growth to poverty reduction.  As more recent literature suggests, 
however, income distribution has crucial implications for the transformation of growth to poverty 
reduction (World Bank, 2006b). For African countries, Fosu (2009a) finds that higher levels of 
inequality in SSA reduce the rate at which growth lowers the poverty rate, as compared to non-SSA. 
And, among SSA countries, inequality differences imply considerable countries’ respective abilities 
to reduce poverty from a given level of growth. In addition, rising inequality would increase poverty, 




As Fosu (2010b) finds from a global sample, however, on average growth has been the main force 
behind both poverty declines and rises globally since the mid-1990s, consistent in some sense with 




  Income growth was the main driver of poverty reduction among the aforementioned top 
$1.25-level poverty-reducing African countries such as, Tunisia, Cameroon, Ghana, and Kenya; in 
Ethiopia, in contrast, falling income inequality explained most of the poverty decline.  Among the 
poverty-rising countries ($1.25 level), adverse income growth was primarily responsible for 
worsening poverty in Djibouti, Guinea Bissau, and Tanzania, while in Cote d’Ivoire, for instance, it 
was mainly the rising inequality. In the case of South Africa, the rising poverty could be attributed 
equally to both factors. (Fosu, 2010b, table 8.2) 
 
III.  EFFECTS OF GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS, AND PERSISTENT 
CHALLENGES 
 
                                                           
16 The converse could hold as well in certain cases, though, especially in low-income countries where, 
by redistributing from the non-poor to the poor, decreasing inequality could actually increase poverty, 
even if overall income does not change (Fosu, 2010c). 
17 These results are, therefore, consistent with Ravallion (2001), who finds country-specific effects of 
growth on inequality; however, Fosu (2010b) goes a step forward by considering the country-specific 
implications of the resulting inequality for poverty reduction.   
   25 
Both economic and political governances in Africa have improved generally since the late 1990s. 
And, this may help explain the significant uplift in economic growth and human development as 
observed above. 
 
Economic governance  
We use two measures of economic governance: domestic fiscal balance, which is government revenue 
less government expenditure, and external balance, defined as the current account balance (trade 
balance plus net receipts from abroad). These are graphed over time using IMF data for SSA, 
comparatively with several other regions, as figure 1 and figure 2, respectively.  

















Figure 2: External Balance, SSA vs. other regions                             














Notes:  Graphs derived using data from IMF (2009a) [Source: Fosu (2010d)]   
 
                                                  
























































































































   26 
As these figures show, improvements in the measures of economic governance began in the late 
1990s. For example, SSA’s fiscal balance has improved tremendously from considerable deficits in 
the late 1990s to substantial surpluses by 2007. Indeed, as a proportion of GDP, the huge deficits 
which were the highest among the three regions (MENA, Latin America, and Emerging Asia) have 
been transformed to the highest surpluses among these regions (figure 1).   Similarly, SSA’s current 
account was in considerable deficit in 1998. By 2007, however, it had a substantial surplus. And, as a 
proportion of GDP, SSA’s surplus was well above those of the other regions (Emerging Asia and 
Latin America), except for MENA (figure 2). 
 
There are, of course, considerable variations across country groups. For example, the bulk of the 
improvements appear to emanate from the resource-intensive countries, which represent one-third (14 
out of 42) SSA countries (Fosu, 2010d).  These countries as a group have improved both their 
external account and fiscal balance, while the balances of non-resource-intensive countries have 
actually worsened (ibid.).  An important implication is that there seems to have been an improvement 
in the management of revenues from resources, as illustrated in part by the setting up of oil-revenue 
funds in Chad and in Nigeria, for instance.
18
 
   
The main importance of the above two measures of economic governance is that they reflect the 
domestic and external fiscal policy spaces that countries have for increasing growth and income 
distribution via spending. This could be in the form of fiscal stimulus or expenditure in the social 
sector, for instance. An improved external balance implies that countries could afford to  import more 
either for consumption, which improves social welfare, or for investment, which could enhance 
growth (Savvides, 1995).  On the domestic side, an improved balance implies that countries are less 
constrained to spend, for they will have less need to raise revenues from higher taxation or borrowing. 
Greater taxation would drain funds from the private sector, while more borrowing could increase 
interest rates; both outcomes would likely reduce private investment and, hence, growth. 
 
                                                           
18 An alternative explanation may also be that revenues increased as a result of terms of trade 
improvements and that these revenues were not fully absorbed in expenditures, for reasons other than 
fiscal prudence. In any case, international reserves in months of imports have also improved from 3.8 
in 1997-2002 to 6.0 for SSA as a whole, and from 5.2 to 9.2 for resource-intensive SSA countries 
(IMF, 2009b).     27 
As shown above, SSA had relatively large vulnerability risks in previous recessions in terms of low 
external and domestic balances. Fosu and Naude (2009) present IMF data showing that the higher 
predicted GDP growth this time around may be attributable to greater resilience resulting from 
improvements in vulnerability risks.  For example, the IMF average growth rate forecast for 2009-
2010, based on revised IMF data (IMF, 2009b), is 2.6 percent; this compares with 1982 and 1991 
respective values of 0.71 percent and –0.29 percent (Fosu and Naude, 2009).  
 
In addition to the above measures of economic governance, recent work suggests that economic 
policies matter for economic growth in Africa.  In particular, the prevalence of a ‘syndrome-free’ (SF) 
regime, defined as “political stability with reasonably market-friendly policies,”
19
 
  has increased 
considerably especially since the 1990s (Fosu and O’Connell, 2006).  Furthermore, being SF is a 
necessary condition for sustaining  growth and near-sufficient condition for preventing growth 
collapse, which has been such an important feature of the African growth record (ibid.). Attaining SF 
can also add as much as 2 percentage points to per capita growth; this is a substantial amount given 
that per capita growth has averaged no more than one percent during the post-independence period 
(ibid.). It seems reasonable to assume, then, that a significant portion of the recent growth in SSA is 
attributable to a rise in the prevalence of this economic regime. 
Political governance 
We employ two measures of political governance:  Index of Electoral Competitiveness (IEC) and 
Executive Constraint (XCONST),
20
                                                           
19  By ‘syndrome-free’ it is meant the absence of any of the following ‘anti-growth policy syndromes’: 
‘state controls’, ‘adverse redistribution’, ‘suboptimal inter-temporal resource allocation,’ and ‘state 
breakdown’ (for details see, e.g., Fosu and O’Connell, 2006).   
  their evolutions of which are graphed in figures 3 and 4, 
respectively. IEC has been found to have a positive impact on economic growth in African countries 
20 IEC is a weighted average (the first principal component) of the ‘executive index of electoral 
competitiveness’ and ‘legislative index of electoral competitiveness’. It takes on values over 1-7, with a 
higher value indicating greater electoral competition.  SSA’s (average) IEC value increased from 3.0 in 
1975-84 to 5.6 in 1995-2004. “Thus, SSA generally went from roughly one-candidate dictatorships to 
multiparty electoral competiveness.” (Fosu, 2008b, p. 442).  
 XCONST measures the degree of constraint on the executive branch of government and it takes on 
values of 0-7, where 7 is for ‘strict rules for governance’ , 1 means ‘no one regulates the authority’, 0  
signifies ‘perfect incoherence’, etc. (for details see Fosu, 2009c).     28 
that have achieved ‘advanced-level’ democracy as measured by IEC (Fosu, 2008b).
21  Furthermore, 
Alence (2004) finds that democratic institutions in Africa considerably improve ‘developmental 
governance’, which he defines as ‘economic policy coherence (free-market policies), public-service 
effectiveness, and limited corruption’. He, furthermore, observes that while ‘restricted political 
contestation’ (with limited executive constraints) has little direct impact on developmental 
governance, executive constraints improve developmental governance even if there is little political 
contestation. These results imply the critical role of XCONST.
22
Figure 3: Governance/Institutional Evolution, SSA vs. World - Index of Electoral Competitiveness (IEC) 
 Indeed, Fosu (2009c) finds that 
XCONST can reduce the incidence of anti-growth ‘policy syndromes’ via mitigating the pernicious 
effects of ethnicity, and thereby increase GDP growth.  
 
 
Source: Fosu (2009b). 
 
   
                                                           
21 Bounded between 1.0 and 7.0, with a higher value indicating a greater degree of electoral 
competitiveness, the threshold value obtained by Fosu (2008b) is 4.4 [data source: Database for 
Political Institutions (DPI)].  
























































5  29 
Figure 4:  Governance/Institutional Evolution, SSA vs. World - Executive Constraint (XCONST) 
 
Source: Fosu (2009b). 
 
As Figure 3 shows, IEC for SSA as a whole has been increasing steadily, especially since the early 
1990s. By 2006, it had pretty much converged with the world’s average.  Similarly, XCONST began 
to accelerate in SSA by about 1990; the gap with the world’s average considerably narrowed by 2007.  
Obviously, there are considerable differences across countries.  In 2007, for instance, Botswana, 
Comoros, Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa all achieved the possible maximum score of 7 on 
XCONST, while countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Sudan, Swaziland and Togo 
could manage only a score of 2 (1-7 range). Similarly, on IEC in 2006, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, 
Kenya, and Malawi were among countries with the highest possible score of 7; in contrast, Swaziland, 
Angola, Eritrea, DRC and Mauritania received sores of less than 4, meaning that they were highly 
politically uncontestable (Fosu, 2009b).       
 
Obviously, political contestability may itself not be enough to ensure that there are incentives to 
provide productive public service. After all, political coalitions based on interest groups may hijack 
the process.  Alesina and Drazen (1991), for instance, present a ’wars-of-attrition‘ political economy 
framework explaining why growth-enhancing stabilization is more likely to be delayed in a more 











































































5  30 
ethnically heterogeneous society.  Having an appropriate antidote to such a ‘war’ would, thus, be a 
pre-requisite for ensuring a more equitable and efficient provision of public services.
23
 
   Fosu (2009c), 
for example, suggests that a sufficiently high XCONST might provide at least a partial antidote to this 
problem, while Collier (2000) observes that ‘diversity is highly damaging to growth in the context of 
limited political rights, but is not damaging in democracies’. 
Moreover, Vollmer and Ziegler (2009) find that democracy raises HD (life expectancy and literacy) 
even when per capita GDP is accounted for.
24 In contrast, political instability (PI),
25
 
 a dominant 
feature of the African terrain, tends to reduce HD by discouraging Africa’s growth (Collier, 1999; 
Fosu, 1992; Gyimah-Brempong and Corley, 2005; Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor, 1999).  Indeed, 
such conflicts can cost African countries more than 2.0 percentage points in per-capita GDP growth 
on average (Collier, 1999; Fosu and O’Connell, 2006), which is more than twice the realized growth 
during post-independence.  Economic growth is, furthermore, the main contributor to HD (Fosu, 
2002, 2004), so that PI is likely to reduce HD indirectly via its tendency to diminish growth.  PI may 
additionally attenuate the ability of economic growth to increase HD in Africa (Fosu, 2002, 2004).    
Thus, economic governance and nature of political institutions appear to play an important role in the 
evolution of HD in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The challenge now is to ensure that Africa’s progress toward 
improved economic and political governance continues. Many of the democracies remain fragile, 
especially with incumbent governments wanting to hold on to power.  Such tendencies have led 
several incumbencies to actually attempt to change provisions of the constitution that limit the terms 
of office for the executive.
26
                                                           
23 Moreover, adverse redistribution engendered by ethnicity could undermine efficient resource 
mobilization, as it tends to attenuate the propensity to pay taxes (Kimenyi, 2006).    
  Inter alia, these provisions tend to diminish the advantage of the 
incumbent executive and to prevent a ‘president-for-life’ syndrome.   Under such circumstances, 
24 The measure of democracy here is the Polity2 score ranging from 10 (highly democratic) to -10 
(highly autocratic), from the Polity IV Project of the Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management at the University of Maryland. 
25 While Fosu uses elite PI in the form of the rampancy of military-coups events, Gyimah-Brempong et 
al. use civil wars or broaden the definition to include other forms of insurrections.  
26 Nigeria under ex-President Obasanjo and Uganda under President Museveni are cases in point. 
While the former failed, the latter succeeded.    31 
unfortunately, the military tends to become the final arbiter through coups,
27
 
 the rampancy of which 
has robbed many African countries of economic growth (Fosu, 1992).    
IV.  VULNERABILITY TO SHOCKS  
 
Trade and political shocks 
Various adverse shocks have had detrimental effects on HD in Africa. The negative international 
terms-of-trade shocks in the 1980s represent a case in point.  A major portion of the dismal economic 
growth that saw per capita GDP fall by more than 1.0 percent on average annually during 1980-95 
could be attributed in large part to the substantial deterioration in the terms of trade during that period 
(Fosu, 2010a).  It is conceivable that such shocks may have contributed to the severe political 
instabilities, most in the form of civil wars, gripping many African countries by the early 1990s (e.g., 
Burundi, CAR, Djibouti, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone), which in turn reduced growth and 
HD. Indeed, 1990-95 witnessed the least progress in HDIX in Africa (table 3.1). This evidence is in 
concert with the finding in the wider literature that the likelihood of civil-war occurrence increases 
with lower incomes (Bruckner and Ciccone, 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998); that ethnicity can 
interact with poverty to increase the risk of civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003); and that ethnic 
polarization, which can be exacerbated by shocks, raises the risk of civil war (Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2005).  
 
It is, of course, much too early to know what the medium-to-long-term implications are of the current  




Hopefully, the impact will be sufficiently limited, so that the risk of conflicts will be minimal. 
Climatic and related shocks could also cause conflicts, which may in turn lead to migration.  Naude 
(2010), for example, finds that armed conflicts and the lack of job opportunities are significant 
determinants of emigration from African countries (intra-Africa mostly).  Hence, we could end up 
                                                           
27 Most recently, in order to presumably restore the term limitation in the constitution, the military in 
Niger forcefully took over the constitutionally elected government that attempted to entrench the 
executive via a constitutional amendment removing the two-term limitation on the executive.   
28 Initial IMF data suggest that African countries would contract, between 2007 and 2009, at the same 
rate as emerging developing countries generally but at a rate less than one-half of that prevailing in 
advanced economies (Fosu, 2010d).   32 
with a vicious circle, where adverse external shocks result in emigration due to the lack of job 
opportunities; in turn, migration can increase polarization as various groups compete for resources, 
which may lead to further conflicts.  In any case, as observed above, conflicts can substantially reduce 
HD, either directly or via growth, and attempts to mitigate their incidence via improvements in 
governance seem crucial.   
Appropriately managed, however, post-conflict economies can recover well (Fosu and Collier, 2005).  
As the story of Mozambique has amply demonstrated, political governance and economic 
performance can improve to raise HD considerably.  Rwanda and other post-conflict countries enjoy 
similar legacies. Despite relatively marginal improvements in governance in terms of XCONST and 
IEC,
  29 Rwanda has nonetheless succeeded in raising its HDIX by more than 4.0 percent per year 
during 1995-2005 (compared with the African average of about 1.0 percent), thanks primarily to 
strong GDPX and LIFEX growths. This effort has been spearheaded by President Kagame’s 
government, who has so far acted as a ‘benevolent dictator’.
30  Whether the success will continue will 
depend on the extent to which the apparent discipline of the country’s government will endure, or on 





                                                           
29 Following the genocide tragedy of Rwanda in 1994, the country embarked on reconciliation and 
rebuilding efforts. Unlike Mozambique, however, the country has not succeeded in appreciably 
improving its governance scores on XCONST or IEC. For example, XCONST has reached only 2.4 in 
2000-04, from a low of 1.2 in 1990-94 (0-7), while IEC has actually deteriorated from 3.8 in 1990-94 
to 2.8 in 2000-04 (1-7). Nevertheless, Rwanda shows considerable improvements on other governance 
measures, such as those from the 2007 Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank:  political 
stability (27.4 compared to 5.3 in 2002), government effectiveness (39.8 compared to 12.8 in 2002) and 
control of corruption (55.8 compared to 35.4). 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp). The Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance published in 2007 also designated Rwanda as the country which had most improved in 
Africa, in comparison to the 2002 data set. 
(http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index/single.asp?countryid=35).  
30 By this it is meant that growth or HD-augmenting policies have been pursued without multi-party 
democracy or a stringent constraint on the executive branch of government. 
31 As it has historically been the case with many African governments, there is a tendency for 
personality cults to develop around the head of state: ‘neo-patrimonial governance’, which can 
eventually erode the initial positive attributes of ‘benevolent dictatorship’.    33 
Health shocks 
Health is a major determinant of development (Bloom and Canning, 2003; Bloom et al, 2004). 
Although other diseases have afflicted the continent, two diseases that have been contemporaneously 
devastating to African countries generally, especially over the last several decades, are malaria and 
HIV/AIDS.  We have discussed the implication of the latter above. As noted, southern Africa has 
been the most affected by HIV/AIDS, with adverse implications for HD.  Indeed, nearly all the 
southern African countries have experienced reductions in the growth rates of LIFEX since the early 
1990s, relative to the overall African growth (Annex Figure A1). For 1990-2005, the growth rates for 
the most affected countries are: Swaziland (-3.83 Percent), Botswana (-2.76 percent), Lesotho (-3.65 
percent), Zimbabwe (-5.08 percent), South Africa (-2.04 percent), Namibia (-0.67 percent), and 
Zambia (-2.53 percent).   LIFEX growth averaged -2.94 percent for this severely HIV/AIDS-affected 
group of countries, in contrast with the overall African annual average growth rate of 0.42 percent. 
Hence, although Africa’s LIFEX growth during this period was not particularly impressive, these 
high HIV/AIDS African countries fared even far worse. Certainly, while such performance might not 
be all attributable to the disease,
32
 
 much of it is probably due to it. In addition to the possible, direct 
impact in life expectancy, several studies have argued that HIV/AIDS has been particularly 
burdensome to Africa’s development process (Azemar and Desbordes, 2009; Bonnel, 2000). 
Malaria is another disease that has afflicted many African countries and has been more widespread 
throughout SSA than HIV/AIDS (Azemar and Desbordes, 2009). It is a serious “health and economic 
problem…afflicting more than half of the continent’s population…It has severely retarded economic 
development in many countries in the region, with poverty and isolation being some of its most 
visible consequences” (Fosu and Mwabu, 2007, p. xiii). Case studies show that Kenya’s per capita 
farm income declined by some 40 percent in 1994 due to malaria (Mwabu, 2007); that childhood 
malaria constituted a major burden in Nigeria (Olagoke, 2007); that there is a strong demand for 
malaria control products and services in Cameroon (Kamgnia, 2007); and that particular attention is 
called for in malaria control and distribution of pharmaceutical products in Zambia (Musonda and 
Mangani, 2007).  
 
                                                           
32 In Zimbabwe, for example, a portion of the health setback might be attributable to the overall 
deterioration in health services resulting from the Mugabe-associated governance fiasco.   34 
For Africa as a whole, Sachs and Malaney (2002) show that malaria has exacted huge economic and 
social burdens on the African population.  Sachs (2005) also argues that achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa, in particular, would be impossible without addressing the 
burden of the disease, much of which is avoidable through inexpensive preventive measures such as 
the use of insecticide treated bed-nets and immunization against childhood illnesses.  Furthermore, 
meaningful levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), which might prove critical to the technological 
advancement required to move many African countries out of ‘poverty traps’, could not be achieved 
without a resolution of the malaria problem.  Indeed, more than a half of SSA FDI deficit with other 
developing countries could have been avoided in the absence of malaria (Azemar and Desbordes, 
2009).   
 
Vulnerability to Recent Financial Shock and Fragility 
Figure 5 classifies African countries on the basis of their respective risks to the recent global financial 
crisis, as estimated by the IMF, and their degrees of ‘fragility’, based on the Brookings Institution’s 
index.
33
   
 Countries on the far-right upper corner are the countries that deserve special attention, as they 
are both ‘critically weak’ and highly susceptible to the financial crisis. Unfortunately, we have some 
nine countries in this category, most of which are conflict or post-conflict economies. There are 
additionally another set of nine countries that are ‘critically weak’ and are also classified as medium-
risk on the financial crisis. Indeed, only one country (Senegal) falls in the ‘best’ category of being 
relatively stable and with a low financial-crisis risk.  
                                                           
33 The IMF index is based on such measures as fiscal deficits, external current account deficits, and 
available international reserves. The Brookings Institution’s measure of fragility is based on a large set 
of variables measuring economic and political governance, inter alia.  For details see IMF/Gamo et al. 
(2009) and Rice and Patrick (2008), respectively.    35 




















































  Ghana (84)  Zambia (32)  Somalia (1)*† 
    Mauritania (37)  Congo, Dem. Rep of. (3)† 
    Djibouti (38)  Burundi (5) 
    Lesotho (53)  Sudan (6) 
High      Central African Rep. (7) 
      Liberia (9) 
      Côte d’Ivoire (10) 
      Angola (11) 
      Nigeria (28) 
 
  São Tomé & Principe (61)  Cameroon (29)  Sierra Leone (13) 
  Benin (71)  Comoros (31)  Eritrea (14) 
    Mozambique (39)  Chad (16) 
    Burkina Faso (44)  Ethiopia (19) 
Medium    Malawi (46)  Congo, Rep. of. (20) 
    Madagascar (49)  Niger (21) 
    Tanzania (55)  Guinea (23) 
      Rwanda (24) 
      Togo (26) 
 
  Senegal (68)  Kenya (50)  Guinea-Bissau (18) 
    Gambia, The (51)  Uganda (27) 
    Mali (52)   
Low       
       
       
  States to watch  Weak  Critically weak 
 
Notes: Figs. in parentheses indicate the ranking on the Brookings Index of Weak States 
(Patrick and Rice, 2008), while vulnerability classification is from IMF/Gamo, 2009.   
† DRC and Somalia are classified as ´failed states´.  
* Somalia is not included in the IMF classification, presumably due to the lack of data; 
however, it is the weakest state in the Brookings Index and is the worst performer on the 
economic index, and is thus assumed here to be of ‘high’ vulnerability.   36 
To shed some light on the importance of the vulnerability risk to the recent global financial crisis, we 
take a complementary approach and focus on the small set of low-risk countries in Figure 5: Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda. The mean percent change of per capita GDP 
growth between the pre-crisis and crisis 2007 and 2009 years for this group of countries exceeds that 
for SSA as a whole by a large margin,
 34
 
 suggesting that the low-risk countries as a group have less 
susceptibility to the crisis than the other SSA countries.   
V.  MEETING HUMAN DEVELOPEMNT CHALLENGES 
 
What are the key human development challenges in Africa over the next five years, i.e., by the year 
2015, when regions and countries are expected to show the extent to which they have achieved the 
Millennium Development Goals? How can these challenges be met? We focus in particular on 
obstacles to improving conventional and new dimensions of human development. There are systemic, 
recurring and specific challenges in this regard. The systemic and persistent challenges affect the 
continent’s ability to improve all dimensions of human development. The recurring challenges also 
affect the achievement of all human development goals. Specific challenges relate to particular 
regions, countries, and human development dimensions. 
 
Systemic and Persistent Challenges 
A.  Income poverty.  Poverty has been a pervasive feature of the African continent for decades. 
Except for a few countries in northern Africa, most African countries suffer from high rates of 
absolute income poverty. Since there is a fair amount of correlation between income, on the one hand, 
and health and education, on the other hand, the low value of HDI for Africa can be attributed in great 
part to the high poverty rate, and conversely.  Fortunately, there is evidence of economic recovery on 
the continent generally since the mid-1990s, with signs of growth acceleration during the last eight 
years or so.  If the historical past is any indication, however, sustaining high rates of growth in the 
region is a challenge, especially in the light of the current global crisis. Thus, policies to at least 
                                                           
34 The percent changes in the per capita GDP growth rates of these countries between the pre-crisis and 
crisis 2007 and 2009 periods, respectively are: -73.28, 38.59, -83.24, 823.62, -141.49, and -35.22, with 
a mean of 88.1 (source: Fosu, 2010d). This mean value certainly exceeds the overall mean SSA value 
of -124.13 percent (ibid.). Even excluding what appears to be an extreme positive value for Mali of 
823.62 percent, the mean value for the low-risk countries is: -58.9, which is still higher than the overall 
SSA average.   37 
maintain the present growth acceleration in many African countries are called for. And so is the need 
to decrease social as well as income inequalities in order to achieve higher shared growth. Sustainable 
development, which goes beyond attaining the MDGs, cannot be achieved without a rigorous pursuit 
of this dual-pronged approach to growth and distribution.  The approach requires strong institutions 
that promote efficiency while maintaining reasonable levels of equity. 
 
B.  HIV/AIDS and Malaria Pandemic. The large declines in life expectancy of the African 
population due to HIV/AIDS within a relatively short period, especially in southern Africa, will take 
years to reverse. Substantial progress in this area over the next five years is unlikely because 
resources are lacking to treat and care for those affected by HIV/AIDS and to prevent new infections. 
In particular, there is need for policy makers on the continent to find mechanisms for effectively 
minimizing the risk of new infections and for providing and financing ARVs in ways that minimize 
risks of the virus developing resistance to these therapies. Emergence of widespread resistance to 
antiretroviral medicines, including resistance to treatments  intended  to prevent mother-to-child-
transmissions of the virus, would substantially raise AIDS-related deaths and the economic losses 
associated with the disease. 
 
Similar challenges apply to malaria, which afflicts Africa even more widely than HIV/AIDS does. 
Malaria is a source of much morbidity and mortality on the continent. Yet, popular and relatively 
cheap medications for treatment can no longer be counted on due to disease resistance (Fosu and 
Mwabu, 2007). 
  
C.  Building political institutions. Peaceful mechanisms for choosing political leaders and sharing 
power are underdeveloped in many parts of Africa. The consequence of this has been failed states and 
civil conflicts. This problem can be solved only in the long-run, but steps to address the problem can 
be taken over the next five years. Short-term solutions include voter education programs, enacting of 
laws for governing the financing of political parties and for settling electoral disputes.  In particular, 
there should be strong restraints to check the power of the executive branch of government, for it is 
the lack of such checks in the past that fostered the political excesses, which have been bad for HD. 
Enshrining in the constitution in every African country a term limitation for the head of state is a must 
if a meaningful degree of executive constraint is to endure. Also a must are political and other   38 
mechanisms for enforcing term limits enshrined in constitutions. The processes will be difficult; 
however, in the same vein as reforms in the 1980s and 90s came about from economic exigencies and 
external pressure (Fosu, 2008a), such a strategy should endure where appropriate. 
 
D.  Resource mobilization. None of the above programs will be possible without financial 
resources. In many African countries, human development programs are unsustainable because they 
depend on uncertain foreign aid, official development assistance (ODA), which is generally perceived 
to be pervasive in Africa. As percent of GNI, ODA registered 6.3, 5.9, 4.1, and 4.3 in 1990, 1995, 
2000, and 2007, respectively. Thus, on average, external aid is currently only slightly larger than FDI 




Nonetheless, the significance of aid is country-specific. For example, the following African countries 
have ODA as percent of GNI exceeding 20 percent (ODA/GNI numbers in parentheses): Liberia 
(44.7), Burundi (37.7), Guinea-Bissau (35.4), Sierra Leone (34.1), Eritrea (33.2), DRC (28.3),   
Mozambique (27.9), Sao Tome and Principe (24.1), Rwanda (21.3), and Malawi (21.1). For these 
countries, most of which are conflict or post-conflict countries, therefore, ODA is crucial for 
development.  In the short run, therefore, the challenge will be to identify those countries that could 
use ODA most productively. 
Related to ODA are debt flows, which have also been an important source of funding for many 
African countries. In 2007, for instance, disbursement of public and publicly guaranteed debt
36
                                                           
35 ODA rose to 5.7 percent of GNI during 2006 mainly as a result of the multilateral debt-reduction 
initiative (MDRI) of 2005 but has now returned to nearly its 2000 level. 
 was 
2.0 percent of GNI (World Bank, 2010a).  On the flip side, external debt servicing can be a burden. In 
2007, for instance, debt servicing expatriated some $17 billion, about one-half of ODA (World Bank, 
2010b). While this outflow can drain resources from the public budget, its implications for budget 
allocation are perhaps more consequential for HD. For example, constrained debt servicing tends to 
reduce the expenditure shares for education and health (Fosu, 2007, 2008c), while debt relief is found 
to have increased the share of expenditures for these sectors in countries which have improved their 
institutions (Dessy and Vencatachellum, 2007).  Although, there is no one-to-one mapping of public 
expenditures into outcomes, public expenditures are necessary, as government tends to be the main 
36 Private non-guaranteed external debt has been traditionally minimal among African countries, 
averaging less than 0.5 percent of GNI in 2007-08, for example.     39 
source of funds for the social sectors.
37
 
 Thus, sustaining recent efforts with debt relief, as in the case 
of the 2005 multilateral debt relief initiative (MDRI), appears to be an important way to improve HD.  
African governments should, however, re-double their efforts to raise resources domestically, and to 
improve the business environment in order to attract greater private funding, such as foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  The net flow of FDI has increased from 0.5 percent of GNI in 1990, to 1.4 percent 
in 1995, to 2.1 percent in 2000, and to 3.5 percent in 2007 (World Bank, 2010a). While there has been 
a definite improvement, FDI flows remain small and, more importantly, concentrated in natural 
resources in resource-intensive countries.  As observed above, improving public sector governance 
would be crucial for increasing FDI flows.  
 
While private portfolio investment has also risen rapidly in SSA recently, it is concentrated in certain 
countries, with South Africa alone receiving about 90 percent of SSA flows (Delechat et al, 2008).  
As country risk ratings have improved on the continent, however, countries like Ghana, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia have begun to attract these private flows (ibid.).  Attracting these 
funds requires further improvements in public governance in order to garner more favorable risk 
ratings.   
 
Another private flow that has recently been gaining in popularity in the literature is remittances, 
mainly from the diaspora. In 2007, for instance, recorded flows represented 2.3 percent of GNI 
(source: World Bank, 2010b),
38 about two-thirds of FDI and slightly more than one-half of ODA. 
Remittances have traditionally played a useful counter-cyclical role in many economies generally 
(Chami et al, 2009).
39
                                                           
37 Current research suggests that public expenditure on health, for instance, has significantly reduced 
infant and under-five mortality in Africa (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2009).  
 In particular, they have been poverty-reducing in African countries (Gupta et 
al, 2007).  Hence, these funds should contribute to improving HD. An important challenge is how to 
facilitate the transfer of such funds without onerous government intervention.  
 
38 The actual amount of remittances is likely to be be larger, however, as non-recorded flows are likely 
to be appreciable. 
39 The evidence is based a sample of 70 countries (16 advanced economies and 54 developing 
countries). The authors find that remittances have a negative effect on output growth volatility of 
recipient countries.   40 
 
Finally, capital flight, a major source of funds outflows from Africa requires special attention. While 
a portion of this flight is consistent with the optimal portfolio decisions of private investors (Collier et 




Thus, in addition to country-specific responsibilities, there is need for collective action on the part of 
both African countries and their development partners to create the fertile environment that would 
expand the available financing resources and also maximize their effectiveness in increasing HD. 
Beyond governance, the provision of regional public goods would require the coordination on the part 
of regional and continental bodies such as the African Union, the Economic Commission for Africa, 
the WHO Africa Office, and the African Development Bank. Financing key components of human 
development, especially those related to child and maternal health and basic education, as well as 
physical infrastructure, should be a priority. 
 
Recurring Challenges 
Recurring challenges include drought, floods, preventable disease epidemics, and economic 
recessions. To address these problems effectively, careful planning and development of disaster 
management skills are needed.  Such efforts might usefully entail regional cooperation, given the 
regional ‘public-good’ nature of many of these challenges. 
 
Specific Challenges 
Specific challenges relate to specific human development obstacles in individual  countries; thus 
uniform policies cannot be relied on to improve people’s lives everywhere on the continent. In some 
countries, for example, in Southern Africa, both HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention are required, 
whereas in other countries, such as those in West and North Africa, prevention should receive high 
priority. Moreover, while in some countries data to construct HDI and to monitor progress towards 
the achievement MDGs exist, such data are unavailable in many others.  Programs to address data 
limitations will vary from country to country and from region to region. Data issues are so central 
because without reliable information, progress that is being made to improve people’s lives cannot be 
                                                           
40 The African Union, for instance, believes that as much as $148 billion is transferred from the 
continent each year due to corruption   (UK Africa, 2006, p. 14). This amount is more than 4 times the 
ODA to SSA in 2007.   41 
assessed. The training of staff in data collection, analysis and storage is also a major challenge on the 
continent. However, ways of dealing with staff shortages and upgrading their skills will vary from 
country to country. 
    
VI.     CONCLUSION  
The last several decades have not been encouraging from the standpoint of economic development in 
Africa generally. Annual economic growth has been low or negative on the continent and disparities 
in living standards have increased in many countries. Concomitantly, poverty has been on the increase 
in many parts of Africa despite notable decreases in others. Still around 50% of the African 
population remains poor, a condition that contrasts sharply with situations in other world regions 
where poverty rates have declined considerably over the past two decades and a half. 
 
Due to high fertility in Africa, more than two-fifths of the bottom billion people in the world are 
Africans (Collier, 2007).  Despite disappointments on the economic development front, however, 
human development on the continent has fared reasonably well. Except for Zambia, HDI in Africa 
increased in all other countries from 1970-2005. In particular, the HDI itself, despite being far below 
the world average, increased noticeably.   Moreover, all the other components of HDI  improved 
similarly, though health shocks in particularly southern Africa have considerably constrained HDI. 
The patterns of time trends in economic growth and in HDI suggest that public policies are crucial for 
human development.  
 
There is some evidence that with appropriate social policies, human development can occur even 
when economic development is stagnant or on the decline. Similarly, human development can suffer 
even in periods of robust economic progress. Human development, as an approach to improving 
people’s lives, is a phenomenon that may not be affected automatically by forces of economic growth. 
Policies such as the ones we have indicated above are needed to insulate human lives from economic 
downturns and to enhance them during periods of growth. 
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ANNEX FIGURES 
The grouping of African countries below into Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western 
Regions follows the African Development Bank classification. 
Central Africa 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, The Congos, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe 
Northern Africa 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia 
Western Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
Eastern Africa 
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, 
Uganda 
Southern Africa 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe   49 
Figure A1: Mean life expectancy 1990-2005 
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Figure A2: Mean gross enrolment 1990-2005 
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Figure A3: Mean literacy rate 1990-2005 
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Figure A4: Mean GDP per capita 1990-2005 
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Figure A5: Mean education index 1990-2005 
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Figure A6: Mean health index 1990-2005 
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Figure A7: Mean income index 1900-2005 
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Figure A8: Mean human development index 1990-2005 
 
 
 
 
 